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This Article concerns whether and how Article I 
administrative agencies can overturn the final judg-
ment of an Article III federal court. The Article 
identifies if there really is a constitutional crisis 
afoot because of a violation of the separation of 
powers doctrine. It also addresses the concern that 
the federal court is the final arbiter of a legal dispute 
and that neither Congress nor an agency can step in 
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to undo that which the federal court has done. The 
Article focuses on the newly enacted America In-
vents Act and the current use of administrative 
agency proceeding to reexamine issued patents as a 
tool to nullify patent infringement judgments. 
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Article III of the Constitution grants the federal courts plenary 
power to adjudicate legal disputes.1 Article III also creates coveted 
judicial positions so that talented and keen attorneys can serve as 
federal court judges.2 It is, without a doubt, an honor to serve as a 
federal judge. To some, it is heresy that once a federal court exer-
cises its full constitutional powers, something or someone else can 
undo its decision.3 
                                                                                                                            
1 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
2 See id. 
3 Symposium, Judicial Independence, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 389, 395 (2008) (“I do think 
some of the ad hominem attacks on judges have gotten particularly nasty in the last 
several years, but that may be a mark of the general polarization of parties and the political 
debate we have had. Judges have taken some of the brunt. It is something that I think we 
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The patent laws are also constitutional.4 The founders of the 
Constitution deliberately chose to enshrine the grant of patent 
rights in the main Constitution by allowing Congress the ability to 
create and administer the patent law.5 The Constitution also em-
powers the government to create agencies to administer the federal 
laws.6 Naturally, in promulgating laws, Congress cannot be ex-
pected to think of every contingency or every procedure, and as 
such, the administrative agency is delegated the power to create the 
more precise tools to administer the congressional law.7 
The so-called patent law crisis that threatens to raise constitu-
tional issues concerns how the patent laws operate within the ru-
                                                                                                                            
ought to keep our eyes on. We should try to keep the discourse civil. It is fine to criticize 
judges for their reasoning or for their decisions when there is disagreement. But when 
criticism turns particularly nasty and derogates into name calling, it is just possible, as 
Professor Geyh pointed out in his book, that if enough mud is slung around, some of it 
might actually stick. So, I think it behooves us all, whatever side of the issues we are on, to 
try to keep the discourse civil.”); see generally James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, Some 
Effectual Power: The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 703, 773–845 (1998) (positing a distinctive role for the federal 
courts in deciding a litigated case with finality, effectuality, and in accordance with all 
available law). 
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
5 See id. We define the “main” Constitution as being the original Articles versus 
subsequent Amendments. While some may suggest that rights enshrined in the original 
Articles are more important (because they came first) than subsequent Amendments, (see, 
e.g., Mehrdad Payandeh, Constitutional Aesthetics: Appending Amendments to the United 
States Constitution, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 87, 99 (2011)), others suggest that the Articles and 
Amendments maintain equal footing. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. V (“The Congress, 
whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments 
to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several 
States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be 
valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the 
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths 
thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; 
Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight 
hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth 
Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its 
equal Suffrage in the Senate.”). 
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
7 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44, 
(1984) (“The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created 
program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any 
gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress. If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the 
agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a 
specific provision of the statute by regulation.”). 
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bric of judicial oversight of patent infringement and the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) process. As will be 
detailed herein, the problem lies in whether a defendant in a patent 
infringement proceeding (the putative infringer) can invoke PTO 
procedures to undo a federal court’s patent infringement verdict. 
That is, because a patent infringement verdict necessarily involves 
an issued and valid patent, once the infringer loses, can he get a 
“do-over” by expunging or impeaching the patent back at the 
PTO? And if so, under what circumstances can reexamination help 
or hurt the patentee? 
In Part I, we examine the basic nature of the patent process and 
the advanced nature of the reexamination process. In Part II, we 
discuss the potential constitutional problem (i.e., the separation of 
powers) of whether the PTO violates the separation of powers doc-
trine by canceling the claim and its effect on parallel federal court 
litigation. In Part III, we discuss the concepts of finality and the fi-
nal judgment rule. We also examine in Part IV whether the Due 
Process provision is implicated by canceling a federal court judg-
ment of liability. In Parts V and VI, we examine certain remedies 
that may exist for patentees and defendants. In Part VII, we ex-
amine the effect of reexamination in the pharmaceutical patent liti-
gation context and why reexamination may be useful in that con-
text. 
I. THE PATENT AND REEXAMINATION PROCESS 
A. Obtaining the Patent 
To understand the constitutional non-crisis, one must under-
stand how a patent gets granted in the first place. The inventor files 
a patent application with the PTO, which then examines the appli-
cation for compliance with the patent laws.8 The examination 
process is iterative, with the PTO Examiner examining the applica-
tion, and the inventor then amending the application and the 
claims to overcome any rejections.9 An important aspect of the pa-
                                                                                                                            
8 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 131 (2012). 
9 Id. § 132. 
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tent document is the claims section.10 The patent laws require that 
a claim pass the tests of novelty11 and non-obviousness12 in order to 
issue and become enforceable.13 For novelty, the inventor must 
show that his invention is new and has not been disclosed in the 
public domain.14 The term “prior art” is used to describe the in-
formation in the public domain, such as documents, publications, 
or activities.15 Suppose, therefore, the patent application claims a 
machine having parts A, B, and C. If the prior art discloses the 
same machine having parts A, B, and C, then the PTO will reject 
the claim for want of novelty. The patent applicant can amend the 
claims to include further limitations (such as parts D and/or E) to 
overcome the rejection. If the prior art fails to teach the machine 
having parts A, B, C, and D, then the Examiner will withdraw the 
novelty rejections. 
The Examiner also reviews the application claims for com-
pliance with the non-obviousness requirement.16 In the seminal 
case of Graham v. Deere, the Supreme Court identified factors to 
consider in determining if the claimed invention, though novel, 
would still be obvious in view of the prior art.17 This means that the 
differences between the now-claimed invention and the prior art 
are not materially different or do not represent any inventive step 
forward.18 So, even if the prior art does not teach the claimed ele-
                                                                                                                            
10 See id. § 112(b) (“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims 
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a 
joint inventor regards as the invention.”). 
11 Id. § 102. 
12 Id. § 103. 
13 Id. § 271. Other provisions may also apply but are not necessarily relevant to this 
discussion. 
14 Id. § 102. 
15 Id. § 102(a). 
16 Id. § 103. 
17 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966) (“Under section 
103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the 
prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the 
pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the 
subject matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long 
felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the 
circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. As 
indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy.”). 
18 Id. 
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ments precisely, the claim is rejected if it is obvious over the prior 
art.19 
The PTO construes the claim terms using the broadest reason-
able claim construction.20 This means that the Examiner uses a 
broad claim construction to ensure that the prior art, if it can, inva-
lidates the claims.21 The broadest reasonable claim construction 
standard is a judicial doctrine; it is not statutory.22 To illustrate this 
concept, we will use the following example of an invention 
throughout this article. Suppose that the initial patent claim calls 
for a machine that connects two pieces by a fastener. The fastener 
described in the specification includes a nail, a bolt, and a rod, but 
does not describe any other fasteners such as snaps, Velcro®, glue, 
or tape.23 As such, under the broadest reasonable interpretation 
standard, the Office may reasonably construe the claim to include 
all types of fasteners beyond those described in the specification. 
This ensures that a patent does not issue if it reads on the prior art. 
A federal court, on the other hand, may interpret the claim more 
narrowly to be the subset of fasteners recited in the specification.24 
                                                                                                                            
19 Id. 
20 See, e.g., Leo Pharm. Prods., Ltd. v. Rea, 726 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(“During reexamination, as with original examination, the PTO must give claims their 
broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification.”); In re Am. Acad. of 
Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The broadest reasonable 
construction rule applies to reexaminations as well as initial examinations.”). 
21 In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d at 1364 (“An essential purpose of patent 
examination is to fashion claims that are precise, clear, correct, and unambiguous. Only in 
this way can uncertainties of claim scope be removed, as much as possible, during the 
administrative process.”). 
22 Dawn-Marie Bey & Christopher A. Cotropia, The Unreasonableness of the Patent 
Office’s “Broadest Reasonable Interpretation” Standard, 37(3) AIPLA Q.J. 285, 288 (2009) 
(“During the examination process at the USPTO, the Office gives pending claims their 
BRI pursuant to decades old case law.”). 
23 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,652,382, col.8, l.57–60 (“In other embodiments, the 
mass can be provided with encapsulated inserts for receiving fasteners such as threaded 
bolts, snap fasteners, expanding fasteners, and the like.”). 
24 See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. BENQ Am. Corp., 533 F.3d 1362, 
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“We next turn to the specification, which repeatedly distinguishes 
between a ‘word’ and a ‘syllabic element’ and indicates that a word is comprised of 
syllabic elements, confirming our understanding of the claim language and explaining that 
the terms ‘word’ and ‘syllabic element’ are not coextensive in scope.”); Abbott Labs. v. 
Andrx Pharms., Inc., 473 F.3d 1196, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. 
v. Eon Labs Mfg., Inc., 134 F. App’x. 425, 428 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding the specification 
8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXV:1 
 
If the inventor’s application is rejected, the inventor may ap-
peal to the PTO Board of Appeals and, subsequently, to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.25 On appeal, the Federal 
Circuit reviews decisions denying the patent application claims—
that is, denying patentability—for substantial evidence.26 In this 
regard, once the PTO rejects the patent claims over the prior art, 
those fact findings are given certain deference and the appellate 
court is more inclined to affirm the invalidity of the patent claims.27 
B. The PTO Reexamination Procedure 
After a patent issues, it is not immune from attack—it can be 
pulled back into the PTO for reexamination.28 The Director (for-
merly the Commissioner) of the PTO can order sua sponte, ex parte 
reexamination.29 Members of the general public can instigate post-
issuance “reexamination”30 in form of an Ex Parte Reexamination 
(“EPR”),31 a Post-Grant-Review (“PGR”),32 or an Inter Partes Re-
view (“IPR”).33 As the name suggests, ex parte reexamination be-
gins with an instigator to precipitate the action, but the instigator 
cannot participate in the ongoing process.34 The ex parte nature is 
therefore only between the PTO and the patentee.35 With IPR and 
PGR, the instigator gets to participate in the process.36 The undis-
                                                                                                                            
may implicitly define a claim term); Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 224 F.3d 1328 
(Fed. Cir. 2000). 
25 35 U.S.C. §§ 134(a), 142 (2012). 
26 See In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The scope of our 
review in an appeal from a Board decision is limited. We review the Board’s factual 
findings for substantial evidence and review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo. A 
finding is supported by substantial evidence if a reasonable mind might accept the 
evidence to support the finding.”). 
27 Id. 
28 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). 
29 37 C.F.R. § 1.520 (2014). 
30 For the remainder of the article, although the term “reexamination” used to have 
the independent meaning of ex parte and inter partes reexamination, we also include the 
term “reexamination” to include PGR and IPR. We also note that in the AIA, the inter 
partes reexamination was eliminated in favor of the inter partes review (IPR). 
31 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). 
32 Id. § 321. 
33 Id. § 311. 
34 Id. § 302. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. §§ 314, 324. 
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puted congressional purpose in providing for reexamination is to 
put a quality check on the patent process to remove improperly 
granted patents.37 
Instigating IPR or PGR requires a lower threshold of proof of 
unpatentability.38 This threshold at the reexamination level is lower 
than what is normally used in civil litigation that tests a patent’s 
validity.39 Assuming that the PTO grants the post-issue proceeding 
and invalidates the claim, the patentee may appeal to the Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals.40 As with traditional appeals from the 
PTO, the Federal Circuit uses the same standard of review.41 Be-
cause the PTO is mandated to use the broadest reasonable con-
struction of a claim, the likelihood that prior art can apply to knock 
out a claim is higher.42 In the end, if the PTO agrees that patenta-
bility is affected, the patent claim is canceled.43 
                                                                                                                            
37 See In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Congress intended 
reexaminations to provide an important ‘quality check’ on patents that would allow the 
government to remove defective and erroneously granted patents.”); see also In re 
Recreative Techs. Corp., 83 F.3d 1394, 1396–97 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“The reexamination 
statute’s purpose is to correct errors made by the government . . . and if need be to 
remove patents that never should have been granted.”). 
38 For the IPR, the threshold standard is a “reasonable likelihood” of prevailing. 35 
U.S.C. § 314 (2012) (“(a) Threshold.— The Director may not authorize an inter partes 
review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in 
the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 
of the claims challenged in the petition.”). For the PGR, the standard is a “more likely 
than not” standard. 35 U.S.C. § 324 (2012) (“(a) Threshold.— The Director may not 
authorize a post-grant review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the 
information presented in the petition filed under section 321, if such information is not 
rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims 
challenged in the petition is unpatentable.”). 
39 See Swanson, 540 F.3d at 1377 (“In PTO examinations and reexaminations, the 
standard of proof—a preponderance of evidence—is substantially lower than in a civil 
case . . . .”). 
40 35 U.S.C. § 141(c) (2012). 
41 Id. 
42 Leo Pharm. Prods., Ltd. v. Rea, 726 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“During 
reexamination, as with original examination, the PTO must give claims their broadest 
reasonable construction consistent with the specification.” (quoting In re Suitco Surface, 
Inc., 603 F. 3d 1255, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2010))). 
43 See 35 U.S.C. § 307 (2012). 
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C. The Effect of a Canceled Claim During Reexamination 
Because the patent claim once existed, but is canceled after 
reexamination, what happens to the claim itself? Is it treated as un-
enforceable going forward, or was it indeed void ab initio? Because 
reexamination is predicated on reissue proceedings, both regimes 
state that a canceled claim from reexamination is treated as if it 
never issued in the first place.44 In other words, and with all things 
being equal, a canceled claim never existed, and may impact any 
judicial determination of the claim in prior or pending federal court 
litigation. 
The essence of the post-issue proceeding is that prior art may 
call into question the patentability of issued claims.45 To this end, 
the nature of the prior art may come from different sources.46 The 
instigator may find truly new prior art that was never considered by 
the PTO in the first place. The instigator may also proffer prior art 
that is part of ongoing federal court litigation. We now examine the 
nature of court litigation and the impact of a judgment. 
                                                                                                                            
44 See, e.g., In re Recreative Techs. Corp., 83 F.3d 1394, 1396–97 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(“The reexamination statute’s purpose is to correct errors made by the 
government . . . and if need be to remove patents that never should have been granted.”); 
Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 807 F.2d 970, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“[T]he patentee has 
no rights [in a non-identical claim] to enforce before the date of reissue because the 
original patent was surrendered and is dead.” (quoting Seattle Box Co. v. Indus. Crating 
and Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 827, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 568, 574 (Fed. Cir. 1984))); 35 
U.S.C. § 307(b) (2012) (Reexamined “claims . . . have the same effect” as reissued 
claims. Cancelation of a claim during reexamination cancels out any previous 
enforcement right the patentee may have had.); Bloom Eng’g Co. v. N. Am. Mfg. Co., 
129 F.3d 1247, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Unless a claim granted or confirmed upon 
reexamination is identical to an original claim, the patent cannot be enforced against 
infringing activity that occurred before issuance of the reexamination certificate.”). 
45 See Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Before the courts, 
a patent is presumed valid and the party asserting invalidity must prove the facts to 
establish invalidity of each claim by clear and convincing evidence. In a reexamination 
proceeding, on the other hand, there is no presumption of validity and the ‘focus’ of the 
reexamination ‘returns essentially to that present in an initial examination,’ at which a 
preponderance of the evidence must show nonpatentability before the PTO may reject 
the claims of a patent application. The intent underlying reexamination is to ‘start over’ 
in the PTO with respect to the limited examination areas involved, and to re examine the 
claims, and to examine new or amended claims, as they would have been considered if 
they had been originally examined in light of all of the prior art of record in the 
reexamination proceeding.”) (citation omitted). 
46 See id. 
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D. Patent Infringement: Burdens of Proof and Standards of Review 
In the typical patent infringement case, the accused defendant 
has the option of arguing that it does not infringe, and/or that the 
relevant patent claims are invalid.47 For infringement, the patentee 
bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that the accused defendant infringes.48 On the other hand, for inva-
lidity, the defendant bears the burden of proving, by clear and con-
vincing evidence, that the relevant claims are invalid.49 During the 
invalidity phase, the patentee need not prove that its claims are va-
lid.50 The trial court does not actually hold claims valid; because of 
the statutory presumption of validity,51 the trial court only holds 
that the defendant did not discharge its burden of proving that the 
claims are invalid.52 For shorthand, however, we refer to the trial 
court as having held a patent claim invalid or affirming its validity.53 
                                                                                                                            
47 See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (2012) (listing defenses to an infringement claim). 
48 See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 849 
(2014) (“A patentee ordinarily bears the burden of proving infringement.”); Meyer 
Intellectual Props. Ltd. v. Bodum, Inc., 690 F.3d 1354, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“ . . . our 
well-established law that a patentee must prove infringement by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”); Creative Compounds, LLC v. Starmark Labs., 651 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
49 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242, (2011) (“We 
consider whether § 282 requires an invalidity defense to be proved by clear and 
convincing evidence. We hold that it does.”); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 
619 F.3d 1329, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“An accused infringer must prove invalidity by 
clear and convincing evidence.” (quoting Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng’g, Inc., 
189 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed.Cir.1999))); Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 
F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Because of this presumption, an alleged infringer who 
raises invalidity as an affirmative defense has the ultimate burden of persuasion to prove 
invalidity by clear and convincing evidence, as well as the initial burden of going forward 
with evidence to support its invalidity allegation.” (quoting Tech. Licensing Corp. v. 
Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed.Cir.2008))). 
50 See Volterra Semiconductor Corp. v. Primarion, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1042 
(N.D. Cal. 2011). 
51 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012). 
52 See Brunswick Corp. v. Filters, Inc. (La.), 569 F. Supp. 1368, 1376 (S.D. Tex. 1983) 
(“Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion that defendants have failed to discharge their 
burden of proof of overcoming the presumption of validity accorded the patent in suit.”). 
53 We recognize that it is awkward English to state that the trial court held that the 
defendant failed to discharge its burden of proving invalidity. Similarly, technically, a 
defendant does not infringe a patent either. Rather, a defendant infringes the subject 
matter claimed in the patent. That is equally awkward, so we refer to conduct as 
“infringing the patent.” 
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Importantly, on appellate review, the Federal Circuit will review 
invalidity determinations de novo, but based on underlying factual 
considerations (for those questions of fact).54 Fact-finding by the 
trial court is given deference by the Federal Circuit, as it reviews 
questions of fact under the clear error standard of review.55 As 
such, jurisprudentially, a Federal Circuit judge may be troubled by 
the fact-finding, and may personally have found something differ-
ent had he or she been the trial judge, but the standard of review 
governs the ultimate appellate disposition.56 This parallel adjudica-









 The trial court, therefore, for typical invalidity determina-
tions based on prior art, will evaluate the prior art in relation to the 
claims.57 Because most of the typical invalidity arguments are based 
on the prior art (e.g., novelty or obviousness), the invalidity theo-
ries are reviewed by the appellate court under deferential fact re-
                                                                                                                            
54 See Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1747 (2014). 
55 See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (“On appeal from a bench trial, this court reviews the district court’s conclusions 
of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error.”). 
56 See Weinar v. Rollform Inc., 744 F.2d 797, 810 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The juxtaposition 
of Weinar’s positions illustrates the impropriety of an appellate court’s substituting the 
personal views of its judges for that of a jury when that jury has reached a verdict based on 
substantial evidence. Beyond creating an appearance of judicial arrogance, Weinar’s 
suggested substitution would give those unsuccessful under the rules before a jury and a 
district judge the false feeling of entitlement to a de novo approach on appeal and a new 
chance to argue, this time in the abstract, that a patent is valid or invalid in light of the 
prosecution history and prior art.”). 
57 In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[Invalidity] is 
determined by first construing the claims and then comparing the properly construed 
claims to the prior art.”). 
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view.58 Therefore, if a trial court invalidates the patent claims, the 
Federal Circuit can reverse that judgment (“holding” the patent 
claims valid), or can affirm the invalidity.59 Similarly, if the trial 
court affirms the validity, the Federal Circuit can affirm the validity 
(“holding” the patent claims valid), or reverse, and invalidate.60 
But all considerations of infringement and invalidity require the 
first step of claim construction.61 Because the patent claims are 
words in a document, the Supreme Court has held that interpreting 
just what those words mean is a question of law.62 Several examples 
may be appropriate. In a first example, suppose an electronic de-
vice patent claims, among other things, a finger-swipe area to un-
lock a smartphone. The claim term could be construed to mean 
that the finger-swipe area has to be contiguous such that the finger 
swipes across the area in one linear (straight) flick. An accused in-
fringer may have a device that has multiple finger-swipe areas that 
must be depressed by separate and distinct finger presses. As such, 
the claim construction could be dispositive of the infringement is-
sue. 
In a second example, suppose a contract contains a provision 
that states that “the performance by Party B must be completed by 
5:00 PM on Day X.” Party B is located in California (on Pacific 
time) and Party A is in Maine (on Eastern time). Because of the 
three-hour time difference, when is the deadline for completion? Is 
it 5:00 PM Eastern time, or three hours later, at 5:00 PM Pacific 
                                                                                                                            
58 See Ray v. Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 608 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
59 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012). 
60 Id. 
61 See Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. AGA Med. Corp., 717 F.3d 929, 939–40 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (“Like an infringement analysis, an anticipation analysis has two parts: first, the 
disputed claim terms are construed, then the construed claims are compared to the prior 
art.”). 
62 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) (“The duty of 
interpreting letters-patent has been committed to the courts. A patent is a legal 
instrument, to be construed, like other legal instruments, according to its 
tenor . . . .Where technical terms are used, or where the qualities of substances or 
operations mentioned or any similar data necessary to the comprehension of the language 
of the patent are unknown to the judge, the testimony of witnesses may be received upon 
these subjects, and any other means of information be employed. But in the actual 
interpretation of the patent the court proceeds upon its own responsibility, as an arbiter of 
the law, giving to the patent its true and final character and force.”). 
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time? A court adjudicating the “5:00 PM” would be construing 
that contract term as a matter of law. Applying the principles of 
contract law to patent law—because the Supreme Court rarely re-
views patent claim term constructions—the Federal Circuit is the 
final arbiter of what a patent claim term means.63 
The Federal Circuit has promulgated various rules on claim 
construction, tools for guidance, and factors to consider.64 It is 
beyond the scope of this article to discuss all available tools of con-
struction.65 Needless to say, the Federal Circuit reviews claim con-
structions de novo,66 per the tools it promulgated. Unlike the PTO, 
the Federal Circuit does not give any claim term its presumptive, 
broadest reasonable construction.67 Rather, the Federal Circuit 
may construe a claim narrowly, may construe the claim such that 
the term is invalid, or may construe the claim to achieve an absurd 
result.68 Accordingly, a disconnect immediately arises in the claim 
construction context. The Federal Circuit may construe a patent 
claim narrowly enough so as to preserve its validity, thereby not 
rendering the claim anticipated or obvious. On the other hand, the 
PTO will use its broadest reasonable construction standard, and 
                                                                                                                            
63 For another example of how claim construction can be dispositive, see Zelinski v. 
Brunswick Corp., 185 F.3d 1311, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (construing how the weight 
between two points could have been either entirely within or partially within the two 
points). 
64 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
65 For a description of various claim construction tools, see SHASHANK UPADHYE, 
GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT & FDA LAW, §§ 2:3–2:24 (Thomson Reuters 2014). 
66 See Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 
1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
67 See, e.g., Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (“The problem is that if the batter-coated dough is heated to a temperature range 
of 400° F. to 850° F., as the claim instructs, it would be burned to a crisp. Instead of the 
‘dough products suitable for freezing and finish cooking to a light, flaky, crispy texture,’ 
‘290 patent, col. 2, ll. 11–12, which the patented process is intended to provide, the 
resultant product of such heating will be something that, in the words of one of the 
attorneys in this case, resembles a charcoal briquet. To avoid this result and to insure that 
the patented process can accomplish its stated objective, Chef America urges us to 
interpret the claim as if it read ‘heating the . . . dough at a temperature in the range of,’ 
i.e., to apply the heating requirement to the place where the heating takes place (the oven) 
rather than the item being heated (the dough). This court, however, repeatedly and 
consistently has recognized that courts may not redraft claims, whether to make them 
operable or to sustain their validity.”). 
68 See id. 
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might find the claimed subject matter anticipated or obvious.69 In 
litigation, the more problematic consequence is that the very same 
prior art that was insufficient to prove patent invalidity (by clear 
and convincing evidence) due to a narrower claim construction, 
may be the very prior art that can be used to knock out a claim dur-
ing reexamination under a broader claim construction. 
E. Parallel Reexamination and Federal Court Litigation: The Problem 
of Claim Construction Standards 
We alluded to the problem that claim construction itself can be 
the basis of the problem. When a federal court rules on a claim con-
struction, its decision is treated as a matter of law.70 That is, the 
ruling is not based on any fact-finding or deference to the facts.71 
Even early case law suggested that it is up to the courts to deter-
mine what the law is.72 As such, the Federal Circuit’s claim con-
struction ought to be treated as “gospel.” The claim term means 
                                                                                                                            
69 Policy reasons exist as to why the PTO uses its broadest claim construction in 
reexamination. See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“It 
would be inconsistent with the role assigned to the PTO in issuing a patent to require it to 
interpret claims in the same manner as judges who, post-issuance, operate under the 
assumption the patent is invalid.”). This makes very little sense because claim 
construction is a question of law that has nothing to do with presumptions of validity. The 
effect of claim construction may result in subsequent invalidity, but the effect does not 
color the claim construction itself. In fact, the courts have repeatedly held that claim 
construction ought to occur in the vacuum of infringement or invalidity. Phillips v. AWH 
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (discussing that claim construction 
is based on intrinsic evidence); Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 
1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The court must properly interpret the claims, because an 
improper claim construction may distort the [later] infringement and validity analyses.”). 
70 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). 
71 See Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 
1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“The question that this court has now reconsidered is 
whether we should continue to review claim construction as a whole and de novo on the 
record, or whether we should change to a different system that at best would require us to 
identify any factual aspects and how the trial judge decided them, and review any found or 
inferred facts not for correctness but on a deferential standard, with or without also giving 
deferential review to the ultimate determination of the meaning of the claims. We 
conclude that such changed procedure is not superior to the existing posture of plenary 
review of claim construction.”). 
72 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to 
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict 
with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.”). 
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what the court says it means: nothing more, but nothing less. The 
scope of the claim term is fixed as a matter of law.73 The PTO, 
therefore, ought to be bound by the claim construction of a parallel 
or prior court. 
The Federal Circuit can impose this requirement of a binding 
claim construction even without overtly overturning the PTO’s 
broadest reasonable construction standard. The court could state 
that the PTO’s construction is not supposed to be the absolute 
broadest construction that is untethered to anything. Rather, the 
court could state that the PTO’s broadest construction must still 
follow the general rules of claim construction, such as the Phillips 
standard.74 The Federal Circuit alluded to this potential harmony 
in its In re Giuffrida decision.75 There, the appeal to the court was 
from a typical ex parte reexamination, which had nothing to do with 
the trial practice side of the new Patent Trial and Appeal Board 
(“PTAB”).76 Yet, the court stated that the claim construction on 
appeal was not of unbounded breadth, but instead had to be in light 
of the specification, as interpreted by the ordinary artisan.77 As 
such, the court was beginning to corral the scope of the PTO’s 
claim constructions. Perhaps this decision began the process of 
merging the PTO and the court’s claim construction standards. 
But the PTO has not agreed to be bound to the parallel court 
claim construction,78 nor has the court required the PTO to be so 
                                                                                                                            
73 See Lighting Ballast Control LLC, 744 F.3d at 1280. 
74 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
75 See In re Giuffrida, 527 F. App’x 981, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“That is so even under 
the Board’s view that the broadest reasonable construction of ‘portable’ requires only 
that the item ‘can be carried.’ We note, however, that the Board drew its construction 
from a dictionary, whereas the PTO’s traditional pre-issuance approach has been to give 
claims ‘their broadest reasonable construction ‘in light of the specification as it would be 
interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.’’”) (citations omitted).  
76 Id. at 986. 
77 Id. at 987. 
78 See, e.g., In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that the PTO 
during reexamination is not bound by a district court’s claim construction because the 
PTO was not party to prior court litigation and hence no claim preclusion applied (citing 
In re Trans Tex. Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d 1290, 1296–97 (Fed. Cir. 2007))); Ethicon, 
Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1429 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (rejecting the PTO’s argument 
that it was bound by a court’s decision upholding a patent’s validity).  
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bound.79 In fact, in the recent America Invents Act (“AIA”), the 
new rules governing IPR indicate that the PTAB ought to use the 
broadest reasonable construction.80 In its first Covered Business 
Method patent review, the PTAB stated that it is not bound by 
constructions of parallel courts.81 Indeed, the Office has stated that 
the claim construction used to instigate the IPR may change during 
the course of the IPR.82 
The problem of the moral offense also becomes clear. If the 
courts have ruled that, because of a certain claim construction, a 
specific prior art reference fails to invalidate the claim, then a court 
would naturally feel offended if the PTO not only overturns the 
claim construction by construing it more broadly, but then also 
uses the very piece of prior art to invalidate the claim. It would be 
as if the court’s ruling and fact-finding did not matter at all. This 
tone of offense was clear in the Fresenius dissent.83 Embedded with-
in that decision was the concept that the PTO, as an Article I ad-
ministrative agency, was overturning the Article III court’s deci-
sion and mandating what the court should do thereafter; i.e., when 
the PTO nullified the patent, the PTO said the court should do so 
too.84 
If indeed claim construction is a matter of law, then the court’s 
decision must bind the PTO’s claim scope determination. There is 
simply no justification (anymore) for the PTO to use a different 
                                                                                                                            
79 See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“We 
have held that it is error for the Board to ‘apply the mode of claim interpretation that is 
used by courts in litigation, when interpreting the claims of issued patents in connection 
with determinations of infringement and validity.’” (quoting In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 
321 (Fed. Cir. 1989))). 
80 See Patent Office Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756; 48,766 (Aug. 14, 2012); 
37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2012). 
81 See SAP Am., Inc. v. Versata Dev. Group, Inc., No. CBM 2012-00001, Paper No. 70 
(P.T.A.B. June 11, 2013). 
82 Garmin Int’l, Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC, IPR2012-00001, Paper No. 26 
(P.T.A.B. Mar. 5, 2013) (stating that PTAB’s instigation claim construction was non-
final). 
83 Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Newman’s dissent in this case recapped theories of the 
constitutional plan, the doctrine of finality, and other arguments, but the tone was clear 
that she was offended that the Patent Office could essentially overrule the court’s 
decision of validity. See id. 
84 See id. at 1346. 
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standard because, in essence, it would be overruling a federal 
court’s judgment as a matter of law.85 Our solution, therefore, is to 
create a discrete set of rules that are respectful of the law and in-
form parties’ expectations. First, if reexamination concerns a claim 
construction that has been issued by a prior or parallel federal 
court, then that claim construction binds the PTO. This is consis-
tent with the notion that claim construction is a matter of law and 
that the courts are the final arbiter of what the law says.86 
Second, if there is, or was, parallel court litigation, but the 
court did not either construe the claim at all or did not construe the 
relevant claim term specifically, then the PTO is free to use its tra-
ditional broadest reasonable construction standard. This solution is 
simple and inelegant, but it works. 
By requiring the PTO to respect the legal determinations of the 
courts, the courts and judges are not offended by the PTO see-
mingly overturning the courts’ decisions. Similarly, parties and the 
PTO have settled expectations as to how a claim will be construed. 
II. THE NON-CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM—THE ARTICLE I 
AGENCY DOES NOT TRUMP THE ARTICLE III COURT 
Constitutional conspirators would read the reexamination-
trumping patent cases as conflicting with separation of powers Su-
preme Court precedent, citing most often to Plaut v. Spendthrift 
                                                                                                                            
85 Detractors might argue that because the Patent Office conducts administrative 
proceedings, then the court-instigated claim construction is not actually binding. That, 
however, is not a valid argument. A claim construction, as a matter of law, determines 
what that claim term means for any context. That is, a term means what it means 
irrespective of the forum in which the question is asked. 
86 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) (“‘The duty 
of interpreting letters-patent has been committed to the courts. A patent is a legal 
instrument, to be construed, like other legal instruments, according to its tenor . . . Where 
technical terms are used, or where the qualities of substances or operations mentioned or 
any similar data necessary to the comprehension of the language of the patent are 
unknown to the judge, the testimony of witnesses may be received upon these subjects, 
and any other means of information be employed. But in the actual interpretation of the 
patent the court proceeds upon its own responsibility, as an arbiter of the law, giving to the patent 
its true and final character and force.’” (quoting 2 W. ROBINSON, LAW OF PATENTS § 732 
(1890))). 
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Farm, Inc.87 The patent cases do not conflict. One must keep in 
mind the difference between what happens in the reexamination 
context and whether that binds or otherwise mandates that actions 
be taken by the courts, versus what the courts themselves do on 
their own accord because of the reexamination. 
After a reexamination proceeding by the Article I agency (the 
PTO), the agency issues a certificate of reexamination that (in our 
hypothetical) cancels the patent claim.88 The patentee, of course, 
can challenge that decision, as it did in Fresenius, and we assume 
for our hypothetical that the Federal Circuit affirms the PTO deci-
sion.89 By affirming the PTO decision, the court simply affirms the 
cancelation of the claim. At no point during the reexamination does the 
PTO direct another federal court to terminate any pending litigation.90 
The certificate of reexamination simply states what happened, and 
does not mandate that any other party take any other action.91 If a 
court entertaining a pending litigation takes action based on its own 
volition (or by motion of the accused infringer), such as dismissing 
the lawsuit, then that is of its own accord or by request of a party in 
suit. 
The separation of powers doctrine is of no help because it is not 
implicated. First, it is not an express constitutional requirement.92 
No clause in the Constitution mentions any separation of powers.93 
Rather, the doctrine is judicially created, based on the framework 
of the Constitution that created different branches of government 
in the first three Articles, and it is not an absolute.94 The Supreme 
                                                                                                                            
87 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995). 
88 Fresenius USA Inc., 721 F.3d at 1336. 
89 Id. at 1338. 
90 Id. at 1339–40. 
91 Indeed, if Congress intended, perhaps ultimately fatally though, to strip a court of a 
final judgment because of a claim canceled in reexamination, it could have done so in the 
reexamination statute itself. See, e.g., Plaut 514 U.S. at 252–60 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(describing the situations where Congress has expressly set aside final judgments of 
Article III courts through retroactive legislation). 
92 Matthew James Tanielian, Separation of Powers and the Supreme Court: One Doctrine, 
Two Visions, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 961, 961–62 (1995). 
93 Id. 
94 See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 260 (“As our most recent major pronouncement on the 
separation of powers noted, ‘we have never held that the Constitution requires that the 
three branches of Government ‘operate with absolute independence.’’”). 
20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXV:1 
 
Court and the inferior courts have used this amalgamation ap-
proach to create a separation of powers doctrine,95 but it is not fa-
cially in the Constitution. To the extent the doctrine exists for clas-
sifying unlawful intrusion of one branch into another branch, the 
Ninth Circuit’s test in INS v. Chadha (affirmed by the Supreme 
Court) posed the test as: 
[1] an assumption by one branch of powers that are 
central or essential to the operation of a coordinate 
branch, [2] provided also that the assumption dis-
rupts the coordinate branch in the performance of 
its duties and [3] is unnecessary to implement a legi-
timate policy of the Government.96 
Using the INS v. Chadha test, the separation of powers doc-
trine problem fails. First, Congress created the reexamination sys-
tem well aware that many times reexaminations involve co-pending 
litigations.97 The reexamination system was created to vet out pa-
tent claims as an alternate forum to the courts but to leave the 
courts’ ability to do so intact.98 To this end, the PTO does not as-
sume the sole duty of vetting patents by removing such power from 
the courts.99 As discussed above, the PTO’s decision does not or-
der or mandate the courts to take any action, and hence, the PTO 
does not assume the power to dismiss litigation or the like.100 The 
PTO’s decision to cancel claims does not disrupt the ability of the 
courts to perform their duties. 
Plaut does not help either. In Plaut, there was direct interfe-
rence between Congress and the courts.101 The plaintiffs in a secur-
ities fraud litigation filed suit on a certain date.102 During the pen-
dency of the case, the Supreme Court ruled in another case that the 
deadline to file suit had to occur within a certain time period.103 As 
                                                                                                                            
95 See id. 
96 INS v. Chadha, 634 F.2d 408, 425 (9th Cir. 1980), aff’d, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
97 See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
98 See id. at 1336–38. 
99 See id. 
100 See id. at 1338. 
101 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 215–16 (1995). 
102 Id. at 213. 
103 Id. at 214. 
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such, the Plaut suit was then dismissed as being untimely.104 The 
Plaut plaintiffs never appealed, and hence the dismissal was 
deemed final.105 The Plaut case was over, completely. Later, Con-
gress passed a law that overruled the Supreme Court’s deadline to 
file suit decision, extended the deadline, and—ultimately fatal to 
the law—Congress ordered that previously dismissed cases that 
were previously deemed untimely filed were now to be reopened by 
the courts and considered timely filed.106 The law also gave retroac-
tive effect to the previously filed cases.107 When the Plaut plaintiffs 
filed the required motions to reopen the suits, the trial court agreed 
that the conditions set forth in the new congressional law were met, 
but ruled the law unconstitutional.108 In affirming, the Supreme 
Court noted specifically that the congressional law was unconstitu-
tional because it precisely required the federal courts to exercise 
judicial power.109 
Proponents of the “reexamination to cancel claims” school of 
thought can distinguish Plaut on several grounds. First, in Plaut, 
Congress was the opposing branch of government in the form of a 
law, rather than an underlying agency.110 In reexaminations, the 
PTO acts on the will of Congress pursuant to its expertise in admi-
nistering the patent laws.111 Second, the congressional law in Plaut 
was an express order to the courts to act.112 In reexamination, there 
is no such final order to the courts to act.113 Finally, the PTO is act-
ing within its statutory ambit and, thus, it is up to Congress to re-
move that statutory authority; it is not up to the PTO to choose not 
                                                                                                                            
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 214–15. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 215. 
109 Id. at 217–18 (“We conclude that in § 27A(b) Congress has exceeded its authority by 
requiring the federal courts to exercise ‘[t]he judicial Power of the United States,’ U.S. 
Const., Art. III § 1, in a manner repugnant to the text, structure, and traditions of Article 
III.”). 
110 Id. at 218–21. 
111 See In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
112 See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 217–18. 
113 Id. at 252–59 (1995) (“If Congress may enact a law authorizing this Court to reopen 
decisions that we previously lacked power to review, Congress must have the power to let 
district courts reopen their own judgments.”). 
22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXV:1 
 
to act when the law requires it to do so simply in fear of a potential 
constitutional issue.114 
Finally, one can even state that the separation of powers doc-
trine is not even implicated in the first instance. The Federal Cir-
cuit is an Article III constitutionally created court.115 The Article III 
Federal Circuit appeals court is the same court, whether any appeal 
is from the PTO or from the district courts.116 As such, even if the 
Federal Circuit affirms the PTO cancelation of claims, as an Article 
III appellate court, it can order an Article III federal district court to 
take action.117 In the strange circumstance that one panel of the 
Federal Circuit is hearing the district court appeal and another pan-
el is hearing the PTO appeal, the court has its mechanisms on how 
to resolve those cases as they are the same court, albeit different 
panels.118 As such, the Federal Circuit speaks with one voice, and 
decisions within its own court do not raise separation of powers 
problems. 
In the end, there is no inherent, structural constitutional sepa-
ration of powers problem, though a problem might arise when ac-
tual litigants attempt to game the reexamination system to avoid 
liability. 
III. THE FINAL JUDGMENT PROBLEM AND THE QUEST 
FOR FINALITY 
Ultimately, in a federal lawsuit, there is a judgment. When that 
judgment is final, there must be some finality. That is, assuming 
the infringer loses, the loser must at some point accept judgment 
no matter what may happen to the patent later. Of course, if the 
parties settle, the parties can craft the settlement contract to ac-
count for later changes. For example, under the final judgment 
rule, once an infringer loses the case (finally), pays damages, and is 
enjoined, if the patent is later invalidated, the infringer cannot seek 
                                                                                                                            
114 Id. 
115 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2012). 
116 Id. § 1295. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. §§ 1291–96. 
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its money back.119 Under a settlement, if the parties contract that 
obligations to pay are conditional on continued patent validity, then 
those terms will prevail.120 
The putative constitutional problem lies in the concept of a fi-
nal judgment. Where the litigation is ongoing on parallel reexami-
nation and invalidates the patent, what happens then? What hap-
pens if the litigation is finally over? And what happens if parts of 
the litigation are over, yet some are still pending? In short, when is 
final really final? 
The timing of finality matters. Finality means that the Article 
III court no longer is adjudicating the case, and only the judgment 
is left to execute. The constitutional problem may lie in attempts to 
get around the final judgment in order to avoid initial liability. 
A. Pending Court Litigation With Concurrent Reexamination: When 
is a Decision Final? 
Defining finality can be problematic. Suppose the patentee 
sues, and the accused infringer immediately instigates a reexamina-
tion. Because of the speed of reexamination, the claims in the pa-
tent are nullified prior to the district court litigation verdict. The 
district court ought to dismiss the patent litigation because no valid 
claim remains. If the accused infringer is finally liable (by appellate 
court ruling) and is ordered to pay damages, a later reexamination 
decision that nullifies the patent claims ought not strip the patentee 
of his award. The complication arises when parts of the district 
court litigation are still pending when the PTO nullifies the claims. 
Is there yet any final judgment? We now explore whether the pa-
tentee’s rights and the effect of a reexamination decision nullifying 
the claims simply collapse into one of timing. 
In its recent Fresenius decision, the Federal Circuit reasserted 
the claim that “an interim decision in one suit . . . cannot prevail 
over a final judgment on the same issue in another suit.”121 Ironi-
                                                                                                                            
119 Id. § 1291. 
120 See Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 780 F.2d 991 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Troxel Mfg. Co. 
v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 465 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1972); Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 
32 (1964) (“[A] patentee’s use of a royalty agreement that projects beyond the expiration 
date of the patent is unlawful per se.”). 
121  Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
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cally enough, the court made this statement, and then proceeded to 
vacate what the court itself considered to be a district court “final 
judgment” of patent infringement,122 because an interim reexami-
nation in the PTO ruled that the patent claims were invalid while 
the litigation was pending appeal.123 But if a United States Court of 
Appeals can refer to a district court judgment as “final” and then 
abrogate the decision based on a subsequent ruling under Congres-
sional authority, what does “final” really mean? Lack of an answer 
imperils the delicate, fundamental balance of fairness and equity 
with efficiency and clarity upon which our federal court system 
prides itself. 
This Part of the Article begins with an exploration of the real 
meaning of federal judicial “finality” and compares the potential 
consequences to litigation of initiating and completing a USPTO 
reexamination before the completion of patent infringement litiga-
tion with instituting a reexamination only after adjudication on the 
merits. We then examine the different procedural avenues open to 
litigants to raise legitimate challenges to judicial finality—including 
opportunities within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure124 and 
through collateral attack125—and explain how principles including 
res judicata126 and collateral estoppel127 all but foreclose such op-
portunities to an alleged infringer seeking to overturn an adverse 
infringement ruling. 
                                                                                                                            
122  Id. (“In light of the cancellation of Baxter’s remaining claims, Baxter no longer has a 
viable cause of action against Fresenius. Therefore, the pending litigation is moot. We 
vacate the district court’s judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss.”) (emphasis 
added). 
123  Id. at 1336. 
124 See FED. R. CIV. P. 59, 60. 
125 See Popp Telcom v. Am. Sharecom, Inc., 210 F.3d 928, 941 (8th Cir. 2000) (“An 
action with an independent purpose and contemplative of another form of relief that 
depends on the overruling of a prior judgment is a collateral attack.”). 
126 See Oreck Direct, LLC v. Dyson, Inc., 560 F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Res 
judicata prevents a later suit . . . from collaterally attacking a prior judgment by a court of 
competent jurisdiction.”). 
127 See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970) (“It [collateral estoppel] means 
simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final 
judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future 
lawsuit.”). 
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B. Finality 
For all intents and purposes, the Supreme Court settled this 
dispute 150 years ago, when it held that Article III judgments are 
“final and conclusive upon the rights of the parties.”128 The 
Court’s twentieth-century decisions echo this policy, defining a 
“final decree” as “one that finally adjudicates upon the entire me-
rits, leaving nothing further to be done except the execution of 
it.”129 The Court even made it clear that “a right, question or fact 
distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction  . . .  cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit be-
tween the same parties or their privies.”130 
With respect to finality prior to adjudication of all merits, ap-
pellate decisions stated that the point of finality in litigation comes 
even prior to adjudication of all of the merits.131 While one early 
Supreme Court decision considered a judgment to preclude reliti-
gating any previously raised claims or defenses,132 another decision 
seems to suggest that the Court finds the adjudicated nature of an 
action unchanged regardless of whether judgment has been en-
tered.133 More recently, the Second Circuit stated: 
Whether a judgment, not ‘final’ in the sense of 28 
U.S.C. § 1291, ought nevertheless be considered 
                                                                                                                            
128 Gordon v. U.S., 117 U.S. 697, 702 (1864). 
129 John Simmons Co. v. Grier Bros. Co., 258 U.S. 82, 88 (1922). 
130 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). 
131 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 
7–8 (1980). 
132 See Cromwell v. Sac Cnty., 94 U.S. 351, 352–53 (1876) (“The judgment is as 
conclusive, so far as future proceedings at law are concerned, as though the defences 
never existed. The language, therefore, which is so often used, that a judgment estops not 
only as to every ground which might have been presented, is strictly accurate, when 
applied to the demand or claim in controversy. Such demand or claim, having passed into 
judgment, cannot again be brought into litigation between the parties in proceedings at 
law upon any ground whatever.”). 
133 See Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 292–93 (1888). (“The essential 
nature and real foundation of a cause of action are not changed by recovering judgment 
upon it; and the technical rules, which regard the original claim as merged in the 
judgment, and the judgment as implying a promise by the defendant to pay it, do not 
preclude a court, to which judgment is presented for affirmative action, (while it cannot 
go behind the judgment for the purpose of examining into the validity of the claim,) from 
ascertaining whether the claim is really one of such a nature that the court is authorized to 
enforce it.”). 
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‘final’ in the sense of precluding further litigation of 
the same issue, turns upon such factors as the na-
ture of the decision (i.e., that it was not avowedly 
tentative), the adequacy of the hearing, and the op-
portunity for review.134  
The Fifth Circuit has supported this contention, declaring that 
“[t]o be final a judgment does not have to dispose of all matters 
involved in a proceeding.”135 
Though patent infringement litigation would appear to be just 
one example of using Article III courts to enforce rights constitu-
tionally administered by an Article I agency, the well-intentioned 
division of powers permits those challenging a patent’s validity to 
have “‘two bites of the apple.’ A nonpatent holder is permitted to 
both challenge a patent in the PTO and the district court.”136 In-
deed, to enforce a patent in federal court, “[a] necessary condi-
tion . . . is the existence of [a] valid . . .  patent[].”137 Many alleged 
infringers have availed themselves of the opportunity to admini-
stratively challenge patent validity through PTO reexamination 
procedures,138 whether prior to, during, or subsequent to infringe-
ment litigation. An analysis of the different points at which an in-
fringement defendant asserts invalidity through the reexamination 
process will expose the comparative inequities in the conse-
quences. 
1. Reexamination Concludes Before Adjudication on the 
Merits 
Strangely at odds with the abrogative authority that the Federal 
Circuit accorded to a reexamination finding of invalidity in the Fre-
                                                                                                                            
134 Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1961). 
135 Pye v. Dep’t of Transp. of Ga., 513 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1975). Finality includes 
prior-adjudicated issues that are “sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect,” and 
“a judgment may be final in a res judicata sense as to a part of an action although the 
litigation continues as to the rest.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13(e) 
(1982). 
136 McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 767 F. Supp. 1081, 1086 (D. Colo. 1991). 
137 Slip Track Sys., Inc. v. Metal Lite, Inc., 159 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
138 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012) (“Any person at any time may file a request for 
reexamination by the Office of any claim of a patent on the basis of any prior art cited 
under the provisions of section 301.”). 
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senius decision, the court took the position that confirmation of 
claim validity during reexamination cannot be conclusive such as to 
preclude litigation of the patentability issue.139 This view has not 
stopped a federal district court from asserting that when the PTO 
issues a Reexamination Certificate, the burden of proving invalidity 
“is more difficult to satisfy, especially because all the prior art 
upon which it bases its anticipation defense  . . . was before the ex-
aminer at both the original and the reexamination proceeding.”140 
District courts have accorded differing levels of authority to reex-
amination results, including considering them “highly proba-
tive,”141 or giving them “deference”142 or a “presumption of valid-
                                                                                                                            
139 Greenwood v. Hattori Seiko Co., Ltd., 900 F.2d 238, 240–41 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“In 
an infringement suit before a district court, the invalidity of a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 
103 must be decided on the basis of prior art adduced in the proceeding before the court. 
The issue cannot be decided merely by accepting or rejecting the adequacy of the 
positions taken by the patentee in order to obtain a Certificate or Reexamination for the 
patent. Once issued by the PTO, a patent is presumed valid and the burden of proving 
otherwise rests solely on the challenger.”). See also Sawgrass Sys., Inc. v. BASF Corp., 
No. 2:98-3574-11, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18198, at *4 (D.S.C. Mar. 3, 1999) (“[A] re-
examination is an ex parte proceeding which is not binding a district court that evaluated 
the validity of a patent at a later date. Indeed, in evaluating the validity of a patent, a 
district court must make an independent evaluation thereof, and may not simply rely 
upon the opinion of a patent examiner to determine a patent’s validity.”). 
140 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Polaroid Graphics Imaging, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 
1135, 1141 (D. Del. 1989). 
141 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Cetus Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1174, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 
1990) (“The court therefore regards the PTO’s reexamination findings of validity for all 
claims . . . as highly probative on the issues considered and with respect to the prior art 
considered during reexamination”); Quantachrome Corp. v. Micromeritics Instrument 
Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1185 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (“The burden of proving the invalidity 
of a patent that has been subject to reexamination is even heavier than it would be in the 
absence of reexamination because the findings of the Patent Office are highly probative on 
the issues where prior art was considered.”). 
142 Canady v. Erbe Elektromedizin GmbH, 271 F. Supp. 2d 64, 78–79 (D.D.C. 2002) 
(“This court accords due deference to the PTO’s decision regarding the validity of 
the . . . patent in any potential future appeal. . . . [T]he PTO is a technically specialized 
administrative agency well-equipped to examine and determine patentability.”); Ramp 
Research & Dev. v. Structural Panels, 977 F. Supp. 1169, 1176–77 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (“The 
Court should give deference to the expertise of the Patent Office where the PTO twice 
found the invention patentable initially upon reexamination. . . . The burden of proving 
invalidity is made heavier when the patent has survived a reissue or reexamination in the 
PTO.”). One court qualified such deference, stating, “Deference due to PTO findings 
upon reexamination is appropriate only with respect to the evidence and prior art that was 
before both the PTO examiners and the Court.” Cetus Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1180. 
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ity.”143 Giving affirmative reexamination decisions such authorita-
tive weight makes sense, because even without further recourse 
through the PTO, an alleged infringer still has litigation options 
after a patentee wins on the reexamination decision.144 
2. Adjudication on the Merits Concludes Before 
Reexamination 
As Fresenius made clear, when the analysis turns to infringe-
ment litigation that concluded prior to reexamination, other admin-
istrative proceeding, or intervening controlling authority, federal 
final judgments have not been treated with the same deference as 
                                                                                                                            
143 Am. Permahedge, Inc. v. Barcana, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 308, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) 
(“Upon issue, a patent is endowed with a statutory presumption of validity pursuant to 35 
U.S.C. § 282, which is strengthened where . . . the patent undergoes reexamination.”). 
Another court detailed the rationale behind the presumption: 
The Federal Circuit has held that a district court, in deciding a claim 
of patent invalidity, must give “credence” to a PTO reexamination 
proceeding, which has upheld the validity of patent claims involved in 
the litigation, where the prior art asserted in the district court was 
“much the same” as the prior art presented before the PTO in the 
reexamination. . . . Accordingly, when the PTO, upon reexamination, 
has confirmed or amended patent claims despite certain prior art, a 
district court analyzing the validity of those claims – in light of the 
same prior art – must recognize a rather formidable presumption of 
validity. 
In re Laughlin Prods., Inc., Patent Litig., 265 F. Supp. 2d 525, 529 (E.D. Pa. 2003). 
144 Greenwood v. Seiko Instruments & Elecs. Ltd., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1455, 1456 (D.D.C. 
1988) (“[T]he reexamination statute does not provide for review of a decision favoring 
the patentee.”); Syntex (U.S.A.) Inc. v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 882 F.2d 
1570, 1573–74 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Congress intended to limit appeals from final 
reexamination decisions to those initiated by patent owners seeking to reverse an 
unfavorable patent decision. . . . [A] third party requester has some rights . . . [but] no 
right to challenge the validity of the Reexamination Certificate by suit against the 
PTO.”); Yuasa Battery Co. v. Comm’r of Patents & Trademarks, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1143, 
1144 (“[T]he statutory provisions regarding the reexamination of a patent and the rules 
promulgated in support thereof do not provide . . . for judicial review of a decision 
rendered in a reexamination proceeding for any party other than the patent owner.”). 
However, third parties still have options following reexamination, because “[a]n ex parte 
reexamination carries no threat of an estoppel against an unsuccessful third-party 
requester. The requester can continue to contest validity in a judicial action although a 
PTO confirmation will tend to make that contest more difficult.” 1-SA02 DONALD S. 
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 6.3.4.5 (2013). 
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prior-concluded reexaminations.145 Forming a consensus about the 
point of finality in prior litigation—analogous to the granting or 
denial of a Reexamination Certificate—seems crucial to fairness 
and equity. The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit both sug-
gested that final judgment would provide that determinative punc-
tuation.146 However, as we have seen, finality may attach even prior 
to the entering of final judgment.147 We now examine the different 
points at which courts have suggested that final judgment occurs. 
a) After decision on the merits, but before the damages 
award? 
Both courts and federal supplements generally agree that no fi-
nality attaches to decisions on the merits without determining 
damages. In Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., a Federal Circuit 
case, Mendenhall sued both Astec and Cedarapids simultaneous-
ly.148 The Astec suit upheld Mendenhall’s patent claims, and the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the findings, then remanded “for deter-
mination of damages and other issues.”149 While the remand was 
pending, the Cedarapids court concluded that the same patents 
were invalid, and the Federal Circuit affirmed the ruling.150 Astec 
moved, unsuccessfully, its trial court to vacate the affirmed liability 
judgment.151 On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that when a feder-
al appellate court upholds patent claims but remands for damages 
                                                                                                                            
145 See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(“In light of the cancellation of Baxter’s remaining claims . . . [w]e vacate the district 
court’s judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss.”). 
146 Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 47–48 (1943) 
(“[T]he court did not lack power at any time prior to entry of its final judgment at the 
close of the accounting to reconsider any portion of its decision and reopen any part of the 
case.”); Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 26 F.3d 1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[T]he 
law of the case doctrine ‘merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to 
open what has been decided, not a limit to their power.’” (quoting Messenger v. 
Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912))). 
147 See Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1961); Pye 
v. Dep’t of Transp. of Ga., 513 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1975). 
148 Mendenhall, 26 F.3d at 1576. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. In other words, Astec was first to litigate and lose liability. Cedarapids was second 
to litigate but got a favorable invalidity ruling. 
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proceedings, no final judgment has been entered.152 Secondary 
sources agree that, in the absence of fixed remedies, a liability de-
termination is not final.153 However, one federal district court in-
itially refused to allow merely potential prospective intervening au-
thority to void findings of validity and infringement even absent 
determination of damages.154 That outlier court was quickly over-
ruled by the Federal Circuit, which countered:  
The district court incorrectly concluded that the 
reexamination decision can have no effect on this in-
fringement suit even if the reexamination decision 
becomes final. . . . [I]f the reexamination decision of 
unpatentability is upheld in the court action . . . the 
                                                                                                                            
152 Id. at 1580. The court explained, 
[T]his court did not rule that the patents were “valid” in its prior 
Astec judgment but rather ruled that Astec failed to establish the 
merits of its defenses of inequitable conduct and invalidity. Thus, this 
court did not “overturn” its prior Astec rulings respecting validity by 
the Cedarapids judgment of invalidity, and it does not do so here by 
recognizing the overriding defense of collateral estoppel. Secondly, 
the judgment of this court on liability in Astec resulted in a remand for 
further proceedings. It was not the final judgment in the case. To rise 
to that level, the litigation must be entirely concluded so that 
Mendenhall’s cause of action against Astec was merged into a final 
judgment. 
Id. The Court described the invalidation of the asserted patent in the Cedarapids litigation 
as “intervening controlling authority.” Id. at 1583. 
153 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13(b) (1982) (“Finality will be 
lacking if an issue of law or fact essential to the adjudication of the claim has been 
reserved for future determination, or if the court has decided that the plaintiff should 
have relief against the defendant of the claim but the amount of damages . . . remains to be 
determined.”); 18A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4432 (2d ed. 2002) (citing G. & C. Merriam Co. v. 
Saalfield, 241 U.S. 22, 28, 29 (1916)) (“An order that establishes liability but leaves open 
the question of damages or other remedies . . . [is] not final for purposes of preclusion 
under traditional analysis.”). 
154 See Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 810 F. Supp. 1072, 1075–76 
(W.D. Mo. 1993) (“In this case, this Court returned a plaintiff’s verdict. The appellate 
court affirmed this Court as to the issues of patent validity and infringement. It remanded 
the matter to this Court solely for the purpose of determining the appropriate amount for 
damages. The issues of patent validity and infringement have been fully decided as to this 
case. This Court apprehends of no case or rule of law that holds that a final judgment in a 
separate lawsuit, in a separate jurisdiction, which may or may not be rendered at some 
undetermined point in the future would control and, indeed, void this Court’s judgment 
in this case.”). 
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injunction would thereby immediately become in-
operative. In addition, if a final decision of unpaten-
tability means the patent was void ab initio, then 
damages would also be precluded.155 
b) After damages award? 
The focus on the existence (or nonexistence) of a damages ver-
dict is a sticking point. But if a damages verdict exists, then courts 
should consider the judgment as final. Even then, however, the ex-
istence of a damages verdict was not always deemed sufficient.156 
Similarly, in Translogic Technology Inc., v. Hitachi, Ltd., the patent 
owner had already prevailed on validity and infringement, received 
an award of damages, and had a permanent injunction entered in its 
                                                                                                                            
155 Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 996 F.2d 1236, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 
1993). In Standard Havens, the patentee won liability at trial and the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the liability holding. The Federal Circuit though remanded for reconsideration 
of damages and remedies. The trial court refused to stay the damages and remedies 
portion of the case in view of a pending reexamination proceeding. The Federal Circuit 
again reversed the denial of the motion to stay and the re-imposition of the injunction 
because the trial court improperly “concluded that the reexamination decision can have 
no effect on this infringement suit even if the reexamination decision becomes final.” 
Standard Havens, 996 F.2d at 1236. However, in another case, the Federal Circuit cited 
the rule in Forgay that “[w]hen the decree . . . directs the defendant to pay a certain sum 
of money to the complainant, and the complainant is entitled to have such decree carried 
immediately into execution, the decree must be regarded as a final one to that extent.” 
King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 814 F.2d 1560, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (quoting 
Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. 201, 204 (1848)). In so citing, the court concluded, “Despite 
the fact that the issue of spare parts damages is still pending in the District Court, the 
Modified Judgment is appealable to this court under the Forgay rule.” Id. at 1563. See also 
Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 733 F.3d 1369, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Newman, 
J., dissenting) (“In distinction from the procedure here ratified, where this court holds 
that neither the PTO nor this court is bound by this court’s prior decision, the principles 
of judicial finality are respected in every other circuit.”); id. at 1375 (O’Malley, J., 
dissenting) (“[D]amages were not still at issue when the action was remanded to the 
district court, and were not at issue when the PTO rendered the decision which the panel 
majority gives such broad-sweeping effect. And, the panel majority’s view of finality is 
significantly out of step with the law as it stands today.”). 
156 See Mendenhall, 26 F.3d at 1578 (“For this court to affirm the findings of 
infringement and the willfulness of conduct against one appellant, increase damages 
against the other, and uphold injunctions against both, appears anomalous in the extreme 
in connection with patents this court has just held invalid.”). The court concluded, 
“Because the Mendenhall patents are invalid, the plaintiffs cannot now enjoin or recover 
damages from these defendants.” Id. at 1584. 
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favor.157 While the defendant’s appeal was pending, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed a reexamination decision that invalidated the as-
serted patent claims.158 Subsequently, the court vacated the district 
court’s judgment for infringement liability and remanded for dis-
missal.159 So, in conclusion, not even a damages verdict was enough 
to make a case “final” for the purposes of a final judgment. 
c) If not after final judgment, then when is a decision final? 
If a final judgment on damages is not enough, and usually dam-
ages is the last phase of a case, then it is fair to ask when a decision 
is finally final. Based on appellate precedents, the answer may 
simply be: “Never.” The Supreme Court held that “[r]eversal and 
remand for further proceedings on the entire case defeats preclu-
sion entirely until a new final judgment is entered by the trial court 
or the initial judgment is restored by further appellate proceed-
ings.”160 Furthermore, the Court ordered a district court to apply 
intervening legal developments affecting a patent’s validity, even if 
an appellate court previously upheld the validity of the patent 
claims.161 Though nondisclosure of prior art by a patentee may rea-
sonably warrant granting relief from a trial court order to execute 
final judgment,162 the Federal Circuit has upheld invalidation of a 
                                                                                                                            
157 404 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1251 (D. Or. 2005). 
158 In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
159 Translogic Tech., Inc. v. Hitachi, Ltd., 250 F. App’x. 988, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
Accordingly, Translogic Tech can be summarized as follows: The patentee won at trial that 
the patent was valid and infringed. The trial court awarded damages and a permanent 
injunction. During the appeal of the litigation side, the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
reexamination decision holding the patent claims invalid. The Federal Circuit litigation 
appeals panel thereafter vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded for dismissal. 
160 G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 241 U.S. 22, 28 (1916). 
161 See John Simmons Co. v. Grier Bros. Co., 258 U.S. 82, 89 (1922) (“As to the claim 
of patent infringement, the [validity] decree evidenced a quasi definitive decision adverse 
to plaintiffs, which, if nothing occurred to prevent, would in due course be carried into 
the final decree. But it did not constitute a separation of the cause, nor dismiss defendant 
from the jurisdiction for any purpose; necessarily this decision remained in abeyance until 
the cause should be ripe for final decree; there was nothing to take the case out of the 
ordinary rule that there can be but one final decree in a suit in equity.”). 
162 See Flexiteek Ams., Inc. v. Plasteak, Inc., No. 08-60996-civ-Cohn/Seltzer, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 156086, at *9–11 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2012) (“[I]n this case, Plaintiffs 
specifically disclaimed knowledge of any prior art, and Defendants only learned of the 
prior art through the filings of another party in an unrelated suit to which Defendants 
were not a party. Defendants then acted promptly, informing the Court of their intention 
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patent based on a reexamination that not only had been litigated 
and held not invalid eleven years earlier, but was initiated by a liti-
gant.163 Finally, the Fresenius court believed that a judgment final 
enough from which to appeal was nevertheless “not sufficiently 
final” to proscribe application of subsequent final judgment in 
another case.164 
3. How is the Disparity Justifiable Between the Comity of the 
PTO and the Courts? 
The two different entities involved in reexamination and litiga-
tion (the PTO and the courts, respectively) do not practice comity. 
If courts openly consider and even rely on reexamination findings, 
how is it that final court judgments of patent validity and infringe-
ment are not accorded reciprocal respect? Courts have trotted out 
a variety of justifications for such inequity. The Federal Circuit in 
Ethicon opined that a decision to uphold patent validity only means 
that the alleged infringer did not sustain its burden of proving inva-
lidity, and therefore yields no issue preclusion.165 As a parallel ar-
gument, the court considered the requirement of a “substantial 
                                                                                                                            
to rely on those documents within five weeks of the documents’ filing. At that point, it 
was only two and a half months before trial. Because of Plaintiffs’ dissembling, 
Defendants had limited time to act, but they acted diligently. Accordingly, the Court 
concurs . . . that Defendants were not sitting on their reexamination rights awaiting 
trial.”). 
163 See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d 1254, 1257 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“This 
reexamination appeal raises a fundamental question – is a final adjudication, after trial and 
decision in the district court, and appeal and final judgment in the Federal Circuit, truly 
final? Or is it an inconsequential detour along the administrative path to a contrary result? 
Although final decisions of courts of last resort are preclusive within the courts, is the 
administrative agency excused? Here the Patent & Trademark Office did not mention the 
prior adjudication of the same issue, although that issue was finally decided in the courts 
in 2001. The PTO’s reexamination decision is now before us on appeal, the same issue 
that we finally adjudicated eleven years ago.”) 
164 Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(“[W]hile the district court in 2007 entered a judgment final for purposes of appeal, and 
that judgment might have been given preclusive effect in another infringement case 
between these parties, it was not sufficiently final to preclude application of the 
intervening final judgment in In re Baxter, and in any event, we set the district court 
judgment’s aside in the first appeal in the infringement case.”). 
165 Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1429 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“The doctrine of 
collateral estoppel does not prevent the PTO from completing the reexamination. Courts 
do not find patents ‘valid,’ only that the patent challenger did not carry the ‘burden of 
establishing invalidity in the particular case before the court.’”) (citations omitted). 
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new question of patentability” under 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) to refer to 
a question that was never analyzed specifically by the PTO, even if 
previously scrutinized by a federal court.166 A trial court in Califor-
nia defended the reliance on reexaminations as opposed to validity 
and infringement judgments by citing the fact that a reexamination 
accords no presumption of validity to a patent and thus requires a 
higher evidentiary standard of proof for invalidity than an invalidity 
defense in infringement litigation, in which patent claims are held 
presumptively valid.167 
                                                                                                                            
166 In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The Board did not err in 
holding that the prior district court litigation did not prevent [a] reference from raising a 
‘substantial new question of patentability’ under § 303(a). As properly interpreted, a 
‘substantial new question of patentability’ refers to a question which has never been 
considered by the PTO; thus a substantial new question exists even if a federal court 
previously considered the question.”). 
167 See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Cetus Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1174, 1179 (N.D. 
Cal. 1990) (“[T]he PTO’s findings should be given substantial deference . . . [because] 
whereas in litigation challenging validity the challenged patent enjoys a presumption of 
validity that the challenger must overcome by clear and convincing evidence, in a 
reexamination proceeding, the posture is essentially that of an initial PTO examination, 
and the patent enjoys no presumption of validity. It is therefore highly 
significant . . . [when] patents [a]re upheld by the PTO against a higher standard than that 
to be applied by this court. . . . Secondly, this litigation and the PTO reexamination differ 
in their approach to claim construction in a way which favors the patent owner in this 
proceeding. Whereas claims in reexamination “will be given their broadest reasonable 
interpretation,” thus increasing the likelihood of a finding of anticipation and therefore of 
invalidity, claims in litigation are to be “so construed, if possible, as to sustain their 
validity.”).The Federal Circuit agreed: 
[T]he court’s final judgment and the examiner’s rejection are not 
duplicative—they are differing proceedings with different evidentiary 
standards for validity. Accordingly, there is no Article III issue 
created when a reexamination considers the same issue of validity as a 
prior district court proceeding. And as interpreting a “substantial 
new question of patentability” to include questions considered by a 
federal court but never by the PTO does not raise any constitutional 
concerns, the canon of statutory construction providing that a statute 
that is ambiguous should be interpreted to avoid raising “grave and 
doubtful constitutional questions” is not applicable. 
Swanson, 540 F.3d at 1379 (citation omitted). The Federal Circuit has also defended any 
disharmony with USPTO findings, stating: 
The awkwardness presumed to result if the PTO and court reached 
different conclusions is more apparent than real. The two forums take 
different approaches in determining invalidity and on the same 
evidence could quite correctly come to different conclusions. 
Furthermore, we see nothing untoward about the PTO upholding the 
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The Federal Circuit has proffered other arguments, including 
noting that the “reasonable Congressional purpose of facilitating 
the correction of governmental mistakes” prevails over mistakenly 
allowed patent claims and does not offend the Constitution.168 
Courts have also analogized to stayed interference proceedings, 
which cannot be maintained if claims are cancelled during reex-
amination,169 or lawsuits pending while claims are cancelled pur-
suant to a patent reissue, which similarly must be dismissed.170 
4. Counterarguments Against Nullifying Court Verdicts 
Through Reexamination 
The above rationales for vacating final judgments of validity 
and infringement based on subsequent reexamination determina-
tions include plausible—albeit sometimes hair-splitting—reasons 
for pursuing such judicial action. Policy arguments and potentially 
alarming consequences, however, weigh strongly against the prac-
tice. The Supreme Court proclaimed, though not in a patent case, 
that “[i]t is not within the power of a legislature to take away rights 
                                                                                                                            
validity of a reexamined patent which the district court later finds 
invalid. This is essentially what occurs when a court finds a patent 
invalid after the PTO has granted it. Once again, it is important that 
the district court and the PTO can consider different evidence. 
Accordingly, different results between the two forums may be entirely 
reasonable. And, if the district court determines a patent is not 
invalid, the PTO should continue its reexamination because, of 
course, the two forums have different standards for determining 
invalidity. 
Quigg, 849 F.2d at 1428–29. 
168 Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“This 
Congressional purpose is presumptively correct, and we find that it carries no insult to the 
Seventh Amendment and Article III.”). 
169 Slip Track Sys., Inc. v. Metal Lite, Inc., 159 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[T]he 
reexamination, if carried to completion, is likely to result in the cancellation of all of the 
claims of the . . . patent. That in turn will require a dismissal of the interfering patents 
suit . . . .”). 
170 Moffitt v. Garr, 66 U.S. 273, 283 (1861) (“[S]uits pending, which rest upon an act of 
Congress, fall with the repeal of it. The reissue of the patent has no connection with or 
bearing upon antecedent suits. . . . The antecedent suits depend upon the patent existing 
at the time they were commenced, and unless it exists, and is in force at the time of trial 
and judgment, the suits fail.”); Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 807 F.2d 970, 976 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986) (“The patentee has no rights [in a non-identical claim] to enforce before the 
date of reissue because the original patent was surrendered and is dead.”). 
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which have been once vested by a judgment.”171 One hundred 
years later, the Federal Circuit warned against reopening final 
court decisions based on administrative action.172 Such a system of 
overriding the judiciary interferes with courts’ obligation to “rend-
er dispositive judgments.”173 Admittedly, while the courts have 
announced and maintained the important policy goal that PTO de-
cisions will not alter “final court judgment[s],” they have not un-
ilaterally defined the term; until the court system arrives at a con-
sensus, such proclamations will remain largely inconsistent and 
hollow while still providing courts with opportunities to affirm or 
vacate infringement findings as desired.174 To that end, Judge 
O’Malley of the Federal Circuit avoided using the term “final 
judgment” by simply proclaiming that “nothing in either Menden-
hall or Simmons suggests that an administrative agency’s actions 
can undermine the conclusive resolution of rights by the courts.”175 
Regardless of the definition of finality with respect to court 
judgments, the reluctance to affect judgments through administra-
tive action stems at least partially from the concern that an alleged 
infringer might gain an advantage through the PTO by purposely 
burdening another party with the expense of invalidity litigation 
                                                                                                                            
171 McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 123–24 (1898). 
172 In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1379 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[A]n attempt to reopen a 
final federal court judgment of infringement on the basis of a reexamination finding of 
invalidity might raise constitutional problems.”). 
173 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218–19 (1995) (“The record of history 
shows that the Framers crafted this charter of the judicial department with an expressed 
understanding that it gives the Federal Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, 
but to decide them, subject to review only by superior courts in the Article III hierarchy—
with an understanding, in short, that “a judgment conclusively resolves the case” because 
“a ‘judicial Power’ is one to render dispositive judgments.” By retroactively 
commanding the federal courts to reopen final judgments, Congress has violated this 
fundamental principle.” (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 905, 926 (1990))). 
174 See In re Baxter, 698 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[I]f a federal court awards 
relief to a patent holder against an infringer, a subsequent reexamination decision that the 
patent is invalid does not alter [that judgment’s] binding effect on the parties [to the 
litigation].”); see also Moffitt, 66 U.S. at 283 (“It is a mistake to suppose, that . . . moneys 
recovered on judgments in suits . . . might be recovered back [after a patent is cancelled]. 
The title to these moneys does not depend upon the patent, but upon . . . the judgment of 
the court.”). 
175 Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 733 F.3d 1369, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(O’Malley, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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and later invoking an administrative invalidity finding to void the 
patent and a judgment of infringement simultaneously.176 However, 
this is not a terribly convincing argument because the alleged in-
fringer is usually the defendant in the suit whom the patentee 
dragged into court. As such, one who is dragged into court ought to 
be able to exercise whatever rights he possesses to remove uncer-
tainty. Similarly, if the patentee is very concerned about his patent 
withstanding a validity challenge, he can choose not to sue, or he 
may choose to instigate his own reexamination prior to suing. 
Though strategic, such litigation tactics imperil the authority of 
federal court judgments to protect patent rights,177 in turn dimi-
nishing the incentive to innovate and develop new technologies.178 
Finally, Federal Circuit judges have raised compelling constitu-
                                                                                                                            
176 Ultrak Inc. v. Radio Eng’g Indus., Inc., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1530, 1532 (N.D. Tex. 1999) 
(“Troxel stands for the principle that where a patent licensee does not contest the validity 
of the patent, and a third-party who is not a party to the license agreement challenges the 
patent’s validity, the licensee cannot avoid royalty payments until such time as the patent 
is declared invalid. The same should hold true in the absence of a licensing agreement 
where a judgment of infringement is entered. In other words, an alleged infringer cannot 
sit back and avoid invalidity litigation costs, but then reap the benefits of another party’s 
diligence by retroactively applying the invalidity finding to void the patent ab initio and 
void a judgment of infringement. As a result of [the accused infringer’s] proposal, an 
alleged infringer “would be more likely to wait for somebody else to battle the issue 
because he would have nothing to lose by the delay.” If courts were to follow [the accused 
infringer’s] suggestion, the result would be very harmful to the national patent scheme. In 
conclusion, “absent fraud or misconduct . . . a patentee should not be held responsible for 
the issuance of an invalid patent.” (quoting Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 465 
F.2d 1253, 1253, 1259 (6th Cir. 1972))). 
177 See Fresenius, 733 F.3d at 1381 (O’Malley, J., dissenting) (“Courts will be tempted to 
try to limit the time and resources spent on patent cases by seeking an interlocutory 
review of their claim construction and liability determinations. In all but those cases 
where liability determinations in favor of an alleged infringer are affirmed, however, such 
bifurcations will drag out the litigation, causing multiple appeals and probably multiple 
remands. Where that occurs, after the panel opinion in this case, even years of litigated 
decisions, which may be affirmed piecemeal, could be rendered meaningless by much 
later PTO decisions. And, when trial courts come to understand the fragility of their 
judgments, stays in the face of reexaminations—which the PTO grants over 92% of the 
time—will become inevitable.”). 
178 See id. at 1382 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The system of patents is founded on 
providing an incentive for the creation, development, and commercialization of new 
technology. . . . The court has weakened that incentive, by reducing the reliability of the 
patent grant, even when the patent has been sustained in litigation. This loss cannot be 
underestimated, especially for technologies that incur heavy development costs yet are 
readily copied.”). 
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tional arguments that vacating federal court judgments based on 
reexamination decisions threatens the division of powers.179 
5. Stays: Only A Partially Effective Remedy 
Sometimes, once parallel reexamination is initiated, a district 
court may choose to stay the patent litigation pending the reexami-
nation outcome.180 Though they do not resolve the existing disson-
ance over the definition of judicial finality, nor the problems inhe-
rent in reexaminations initiated after findings of validity and in-
fringement, stays remain helpful tools to avoid abuse with respect 
to reexaminations pursued concurrently with litigation,181 and to 
that end are advantageous in myriad ways.182 Factors proffered to 
                                                                                                                            
179 See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1364–65 (Newman, J., 
dissenting) (“The court’s ruling that PTO reexamination overrides the prior adjudication 
of patent validity is contrary to the legislative purposes of reexamination, offensive to 
principles of litigation finality and repose, and violative of the Constitution. The judicial 
decision of patent validity is not available for review, revision, or annulment by the PTO. 
When the issue of patent validity has been litigated and finally decided in the courts, this 
binds not only other courts, the parties, and the public; it binds the other branches of 
government.”). 
180 See, e.g., ASCII Corp. v. STD Entm’t USA, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1378 (N.D. Cal. 
1994). 
181 See id. at 1381 (“[T]here is a liberal policy in favor of granting motions to stay 
proceedings pending the outcome of USPTO reexamination or reissue proceedings.”); 
Slip Track Sys., Inc. v. Metal Lite, Inc., 159 F.3d 1337, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (In a stayed 
infringement proceeding, “if the [patentee’s] claims were canceled in the reexamination, 
[it] would eliminate the need to try the infringement issue.”). By not granting a stay of 
infringement proceedings, a court 
runs the risk of inconsistent adjudications or issuance of advisory 
opinions. . . . Since the court must decide the summary judgment 
motions well in advance of trial, it would have to address the 
arguments raised before the PTO. Such a situation raises resource 
questions. . . . Since the PTO cannot stay the reexamination once a 
request has been granted, the court’s issuance of a stay is the only 
way to avoid the potential for conflict. 
Gioello Enters. v. Mattel, Inc., No. 99-375 GMS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26158, at *3–5 
(D. Del. Jan. 29, 2001). 
182 Gioello, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26158 at *2–3 (“Numerous courts have cited a 
number of advantages of granting a stay pending PTO reexamination: (1) all prior art 
presented to the court at trial will have been first considered by the PTO with its 
particular expertise, (2) many discovery problems relating to the prior art can be 
alleviated, (3) if patent is declared invalid, the suit will likely be dismissed, (4) the 
outcome of the reexamination may encourage a settlement without further involvement of 
the court, (5) the record of the reexamination would probably be entered at trial, reducing 
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assist a court in determining whether to stay infringement litigation 
include: “(1) whether a stay would unduly prejudice or present a 
clear tactical disadvantage to the non-moving party; (2) whether a 
stay will simplify the issues in question and trial of the case; and (3) 
whether discovery is complete and whether a trial date has been 
set.”183 Though grants and denials of stays have largely paralleled 
judicial concerns reflected in the factors about efficiency and pre-
judice,184 stays have often been granted at the conclusion of discov-
ery.185 Additionally, stays have been granted to alleged infringers 
much more frequently than to patent owners, who would logically 
derive the greater benefit by avoiding expensive concurrent litiga-
                                                                                                                            
the complexity and the length of the litigation, (6) issues, defenses, and evidence will be 
more easily limited in pre-trial conferences and (7) the cost will likely be reduced both for 
the parties and the court.”). 
183 Xerox Corp. v. 3 Com Corp., 69 F. Supp. 2d 404, 406 (W.D.N.Y. 1999). See also 
Docusign Inc. v. RPost Commc’ns Ltd., No. C13–735–MJP, 2014 WL 2178234, at *1 
(W.D. Wash. May 23, 2014) (granting stay of litigation pending reexamination); Bos. 
Heart Diagnostics Corp. v. Health Diagnostics Lab., Inc., No. 13–13111–FDS, 2014 WL 
2048436, at *1 (D. Mass. May 16, 2014) (granting stay) (“There is a “liberal policy in 
favor of granting motions to stay proceedings pending the outcome of reexamination, 
especially in cases that are still in the initial stages of litigation and where there has been 
little or no discovery.”). But see Carrier Corp. v. Goodman Global, Inc., No. 12–930–SLR, 
2014 WL 2042470 (D. Del. May 8, 2014) (denying stay of litigation pending 
reexamination). 
184 See, e.g., Freeman v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 661 F. Supp. 886, 888 (D. Del. 1987) 
(holding that stay was inappropriate where discovery was concluded and a grant of stay 
would allow the alleged infringer to use reexamination purely as a dilatory tactic); Digital 
Magnetic Sys. v. Ansley, 213 U.S.P.Q. 290, 290 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (denying motion for 
stay where reexamination proceeding was initiated after close of discovery and PTO had 
not yet ruled on reexamination request); Enprotech Corp. v. Autotech Corp., 15 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1319, 1320 (denying patentee’s motion for stay where discovery was almost 
complete and reexamination would not resolve issues of patentee’s alleged inequitable 
conduct); Gladish v. Tyco Toys, Inc., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1718, 1720 (denying patentee’s 
motion for stay where stay would prejudice defendant in its ability to continue discovery 
on prior use issue); Target Therapeutics Inc. v. SciMed Life Sys. Inc., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 
2022, 2024 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (granting stay where litigation was at early stages). 
185 See, e.g., Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 951, 953 (granting 
stay even though reexamination request had been filed by non-party to litigation at a point 
when discovery had substantially progressed). Stays have been granted even when the 
movant is a party and considerable litigation discovery has been completed. Grayling 
Indus. v. GPAC Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1872, 1874 (N.D. Ga. 1991); Emhart Indus. Inc. v. 
Sankyo Seiki Mfg. Co., Ltd., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1889, 1892 (N.D. Ill. 1987). 
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tion expenses.186 Only through greater uniformity in courts’ ruling 
on stays will their effectiveness and reliability increase. 
C. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60 
If the various aforementioned justifications to permit vacating 
judgments do not persuade critics of the practice, then does such 
authority exist elsewhere in the law, albeit in a less explored area? 
Three distinct options drawn from within Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 59 and 60 may prove dispositive.187 But as shall be seen, 
none indisputably allow the defendant to vacate the judgment. 
1. Newly Discovered Evidence Under Rule 59(a) 
Rule 59(a) provides the authority for a federal court to set aside 
a verdict and order a new trial,188 but only “when the verdict is 
against the clear weight of the evidence, or is based upon evidence 
which is false, or will result in a clear miscarriage of justice.”189 
The moving party must be “unfairly made the victim of sur-
prise . . . inconsistent with substantial justice.”190 Though the Rule 
does not specify the standards for granting a new trial based on new 
evidence, courts have set forth elements or factors to determine 
when to grant a motion.191 The circumstances that have necessi-
                                                                                                                            
186 Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation 
System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 80 n.350 (1997) (“Stays are 
generally granted when sought by alleged infringers at a reasonably early stage in the 
litigation, whereas stays are generally denied when sought by patent owner plaintiffs, 
irrespective of the stage of the litigation.”). 
187 FED. R. CIV. P. 59, 60. 
188 FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a) (“The court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of 
the issues—and as to any party—as follows: (A) after a jury trial, for any reason for which 
a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court; or (B) after a 
nonjury trial, for any reason for which a rehearing has heretofore been granted in a suit in 
equity in federal court.”). 
189 Ahern v. Scholz, 85 F.3d 774, 780 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Torres–Troche v. 
Municipality of Yauco, 873 F.2d 499 (1st Cir.1989)). 
190 Perez-Perez v. Popular Leasing Rental, Inc., 993 F.2d 281, 287 (1st Cir. 1993). 
191 Buell v. Sec. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 784 F. Supp. 1533, 1536 (D. Colo. 1992), aff’d, 987 
F.2d 1467 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[A] court should consider, among other things, the reasons 
for the moving party’s default, the importance of the omitted evidence to the moving 
party’s case, whether the evidence was available to the non-movant before responding to 
the summary judgment motion, and the likelihood that the nonmoving party will suffer 
unfair prejudice if the case is reopened.”). A party seeking to supplement its motion with 
new evidence must show either that: “(a) the evidence is newly discovered, or (2) if the 
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tated new trials based on newly discovered evidence are limited;192 
they encompass evidence not available at the time of ruling on an 
issue,193 evidence on an issue the parties did not previously antic-
ipate being relevant to disposition,194 or evidence apparently inten-
tionally withheld until, and only discovered after, a motion or re-
sponse was filed.195 
None of these situations parallels those in which an alleged in-
fringer seizes the opportunity to use evidence to invalidate patent 
                                                                                                                            
evidence was available . . . [previously], that counsel made a diligent though unsuccessful 
attempt to discover the evidence.” In re Sun Healthcare Grp., Inc., 214 F.R.D. 671, 673 
(D.N.M. 2003) (alteration in original). The Federal Circuit has explained, 
Rule 59(a) does not explicitly discuss the standards for granting or 
denying a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. 
Instead, it permits the grant of a new trial “for any of the reasons for 
which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the 
courts of the United States.” We have applied specific rules 
governing when a court may grant a motion for a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence. 
Colon-Millin v. Sears Roebuck De P.R., Inc., 455 F.3d 30, 36 n.4 (1st Cir. 2006) (citation 
omitted). The court cited the First Circuit’s Acosta-Mestre holding for the requisite rule 
elements, in which it stated, 
To warrant granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, 
the movant must demonstrate that (1) the evidence has been 
discovered since trial; (2) the evidence could not by due diligence 
have been discovered earlier; (3) the evidence is not merely 
cumulative or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such a nature 
that it would probably change the result if a new trial is granted. 
Acosta-Mestre v. Hilton Int’l of P.R., Inc., 156 F.3d 49, 56 (1st Cir. 1998). 
192 See Goland v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 607 F.2d 339, 370 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“The 
occasions when newly discovered evidence or changed circumstances will warrant setting 
aside a final judgment are limited procedurally as well as substantively.”). 
193 See e.g., Bell v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Jefferson Cnty., 451 F.3d 1097, 1102 (10th 
Cir. 2006) (finding that evidence of settlement agreement between former county 
employee and county qualified as newly discovered evidence for the purpose of the 
terminated employee’s renewed application for attorney fees to alter or amend the prior 
judgment, because the settlement was evidence not available at the time of the initial 
ruling on attorney fees). 
194 See e.g., Matter of Prince, 85 F.3d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that records were 
newly discovered evidence where parties did not, prior to the hearing, foresee that the 
issue would be relevant and were not given an opportunity to collect evidence). 
195 E.g., McClendon v. B & H Servs., Inc., 910 F. Supp. 364, 366 (E.D. Tenn. 1995) 
(concluding that a job order was newly discovered evidence, as would support a motion to 
alter or amend the judgment in employee’s Fair Labor Standards Act claim against 
employer, where the job order was received after the employee filed his response to the 
employer’s summary judgment motion). 
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claims during a reexamination decision following a judgment of va-
lidity and infringement. Evidence that is not newly discovered can-
not support a motion under Rule 59(a).196 Courts invariably deny 
motions when the evidence proffered with the motion adds no new 
proof197 or was readily available to the movant before the decision 
in the judicial proceedings.198 
One could quibble over just what the term “new evidence” 
might mean in the reexamination context. If the reexamination 
knocked out the patent on evidence (such as prior art) that was not 
part of the prior litigation, then perhaps a court might be persuaded 
that the entire reexamination proceeding and facts adjudicated 
therein qualify as new evidence for the purposes of Rule 59(a). 
Perhaps the prior art in the reexamination is not new per se, but 
still results in the cancelation of the relevant claims. The defendant 
may argue that, although the prior art itself is not new, the fact that 
the claims are now canceled is new evidence for the purposes of 
Rule 59(a). A later reexamination determination of claim cancela-
tion is certainly “new” in view of the earlier court judgment and by 
definition could not have been raised earlier. 
                                                                                                                            
196 Pavlik v. Lane Ltd./Tobacco Exporters Int’l, 135 F.3d 876, 882 n.2 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(“[W]hen evidence is not newly discovered, a party may not submit that evidence in 
support of a motion to reconsider . . . .”). 
197 See, e.g., Williams v. Hobbs, 658 F.3d 842, 853 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that the 
inmates’ new evidence did not warrant a vacatur of judgment dismissing their action 
because such new evidence did not add anything concrete to the evidence provided in the 
inmates’ complaint); Odhiambo v. Republic of Kenya, 947 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 
2013) (finding that the evidence proffered by a Kenyan refugee on a motion to alter or 
amend judgment did not constitute new evidence because the motion raised no facts 
previously unknown to him and mostly repeated information in the first amended 
complaint). 
198 See, e.g., Montgomery v. Bagley, 581 F.3d 440, 452 (6th Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc 
granted, vacated (Jan. 21, 2010) (concluding that affidavits did not qualify as newly 
discovered evidence nor support the state’s motion to alter or amend the judgment 
granting the habeas petition, because the affiants still lived in the area, the information in 
the police report could have been used to locate the affiant, the police made no effort to 
determine the veracity of the report despite notice, and the affidavits were readily 
discoverable at the time of the initial trial, at the time the habeas petition was filed, and 
long before the writ was issued); ICEE Distribs., Inc. v. J&J Snack Foods Corp., 445 F.3d 
841, 848 (5th Cir. 2006) (refusing to reconsider summary judgment despite new evidence 
calling into doubt the validity of the defendant’s license because the evidence in question 
had been available or easily discoverable before summary judgment). 
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2. Void Judgment 
Rule 60(b)(4) provides for grounds for relief from a void judg-
ment,199 based on the basic Supreme Court tenet that “[f]ederal 
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.”200 Parties may bring Rule 
60(b) motions even after final judgment has been entered,201 and 
deciding such a motion on a judgment entered absent proper sub-
ject matter jurisdiction can be challenging,202 because it raises op-
posing policy concerns.203 Similarly, a court must rule that a judg-
ment entered absent proper personal jurisdiction is void.204 Invari-
ably, the judgment must suffer a “fundamental infirmity,”205 a re-
quirement that is substantiated when a court was “powerless to 
enter it.”206 Thus, Rule 60(b)(4) provides a very narrow remedy.207 
                                                                                                                            
199 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(4). (“On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party 
or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: . . . (4) the judgment is void.”). Because “a void judgment is a legal nullity, it 
may be challenged not only directly but also by collateral attack in a proceeding in any 
court where that judgment’s validity comes in issue.” Graciette v. Star Guidance, Inc., 66 
F.R.D. 424, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
200 See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 
201 Fafel v. Dipaola, 399 F.3d 403, 414 (1st Cir. 2005) (“If an offer of judgment is 
accepted and judgment entered, a court may still be called upon . . . to decide a motion 
brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to vacate the . . . judgment.”). 
202 See id. at 410 (“[D]etermining when a judgment rendered in the absence of subject-
matter jurisdiction is ‘void’ for purposes of collateral attack is an issue of some 
complexity.”). 
203 See Kan. City S. Ry. Co. v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 624 F.2d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 
1980) (“Competing policies are at stake in setting aside a federal court judgment as void 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction: observation of limits on federal jurisdiction and 
need for judgments that are final.”). 
204 See Nature’s First Inc. v. Nature’s First Law, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 368, 372 (D. 
Conn. 2006) (“A default judgment entered against a party not subject to the district 
court’s personal jurisdiction is a nullity, or is ‘void.’ . . . . Accordingly, a default judgment 
obtained by way of defective service is void for lack of personal jurisdiction and must be 
set aside as a matter of law.”). Motions under this subsection of the Rule “leave no 
margin for consideration of the district court’s discretion as the judgments themselves are 
by definition either legal nullities or not.” Baragona v. Kuwait & Gulf Link Transport Co., 
691 F. Supp. 1351, 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2009). However, “a court has discretion . . . to decline 
to vacate a merely voidable judgment.” Sagers v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 68 F.R.D. 
686, 689 (N.D. Ga. 1975). 
205 United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 270 (2010) (“[T]he 
infirmity may be raised even after the judgment becomes final.”). 
206 Karsner v. Lothian, 532 F.3d 876, 886 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Combs v. Nick 
Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). A court is powerless “[i]f the 
underlying judgment is void because the court lacked personal or subject matter 
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Because the federal courts have original jurisdiction over patent 
infringement lawsuits,208 and provided that the court has proper 
personal jurisdiction and venue, a final judgment of validity and 
infringement is not void simply because it is adverse to a defen-
dant’s interests. Rule 60(b)(4) does not provide an appropriate ba-
sis to vacate a final patent validity judgment based on a subsequent 
decision.209 
But again the argument could be made that, if indeed a patent 
canceled through reexamination means that the patent was void ab 
initio, then perhaps it qualifies to void the judgment through Rule 
60(b)(4). It stands to reason that, if the judgment is not void, then 
the judgment has enforcement and that the enforcement includes 
the right to exclude others from infringing the patent.210 But the 
effect of the canceled patent is that the patent no longer confers 
any enforceable rights. There is no right to exclude anymore. As 
such, the effect of the canceled patent might be that the court 
lacked initial subject matter jurisdiction, which is an express 
ground under Rule 60(b) to void the judgment.211 It does not seem 
fair that if the defendant shows that the patent is void ab initio, that 
judgments built upon that non-existent patent are not equally void. 
                                                                                                                            
jurisdiction or because the entry of the order violated the due process rights of the 
respondent.” Textile Banking Co., Inc. v. Rentschler, 657 F.2d 844, 850 (7th Cir. 1981). 
Only rarely, when there is “clear usurpation of power will a judgment be rendered void.” 
Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645, 649 (1st Cir. 1972). 
207 V. T. A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 225 (10th Cir. 1979) (“In the interest of 
finality, the concept of setting aside a judgment on voidness grounds is narrowly 
constricted.”). Courts “narrowly construe the concept of a ‘void’ order under Rule 
60(b)(4) precisely because of the threat to finality of judgments and the risk that 
litigants . . . will use Rule 60(b)(4) to circumvent an appeal process they elected not to 
follow.” Wendt v. Leonard, 431 F.3d 410, 412 (4th Cir. 2005). A motion that “the 
judgment is void is not a substitute for a timely appeal.” Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 270–71. 
Additionally, “[a] judgment is not void . . . simply because it is or may have been 
erroneous.” Id. at 270 (quoting Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1995)). “Only when 
the jurisdictional error is ‘egregious’ will courts treat the judgment as void.” United 
States v. Tittjung, 235 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir. 2000). 
208 See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2012). 
209 See V. T. A., 597 F.2d at 225 (denying petitioners’ 60(b)(4) motion and finding that 
the court had jurisdiction over the parties and over the subject matter in the decree 
proceeding). 
210 35 U.S.C. § 283 (regarding injunction); see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 
547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (regarding factors to consider in injunctions). 
211 See V. T. A., 597 F.2d at 224. 
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3. The Catchall Provision: Any Other Grounds Justifying 
Relief 
Rule 60(b)(6) provides relief that may only be granted for “ex-
ceptional or extraordinary circumstances.”212 The change in cir-
cumstances warranting relief “must have been unforeseen.”213 The 
Rule vests courts with “equitable power to do justice” but not 
“standardless residual discretionary power to set aside judg-
ments.”214 In fact, the Federal Circuit has denied a Rule 60(b)(6) 
motion where a defendant was “aware of the prior art upon which 
its reexamination petition was based well before trial, [but] failed to 
file the reexamination petition until after the unfavorable judgment 
was entered.”215 A favorable subsequent reexamination decision 
may not constitute “any other reason that justifies relief.”216 Or 
does it? 
As we suggested earlier, a canceled patent is considered void ab 
initio. It never existed. Anyone affected by the patent is now out 
from under the patent. Previously enjoined defendants are no long-
er harmed by the patent.217 
                                                                                                                            
212 Louisville Bedding Co. v. Pillowtex Corp., 455 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
213 McCray v. Dawson, 953 F. Supp. 1476, 1479 (“[A]lthough the change in 
circumstances need not have been unforeseeable.”). 
214 Martinez-McBean v. Gov’t of V.I., 562 F.2d 908, 911 (3d Cir. 1977) (“[I]t is 
improper to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(6) if the aggrieved party could have reasonably 
sought the same relief by means of appeal.”). Furthermore, “[i]f a party makes a 
conscious and informed choice of litigation strategy, he cannot seek extraordinary relief 
merely because his assessment of the consequences was incorrect.” In re Master Key 
Antitrust Litig., 76 F.R.D. 460, 464 (D. Conn. 1977), aff’d, 580 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1978). 
215 Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
216 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6). 
217 While an aggressive defendant may view the final cancelation of a patent to 
automatically lift any injunction, that defendant may not consider the renewed conduct to 
constitute infringement or contempt of an injunction. A more conservative defendant 
may choose to petition a court to formally remove the injunction so that there is no issue 
of contempt of court process. We do not opine on which is the right course of action. 
Though in the pharmaceutical drug context, a prior losing defendant (usually a generic 
drug company) might need to petition the court to lift the injuction against itself and the 
injunction that is lodged against the FDA from approving the generic drug dossier. See 35 
U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(A). See also UPADHYE, supra note 65, §§ 16:3, 16:4.  
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D. Collateral Attack 
If the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure arguably do not provide 
the authoritative basis for subsequently vacating a final judgment of 
validity and infringement, perhaps the collateral attack doctrine 
offers a defendant such an opportunity. Given that reexaminations 
and infringement litigation can proceed concurrently, collateral at-
tack would seem the rational choice for a defendant, as it is “an 
action with an independent purpose and contemplative of another 
form of relief that depends on the overruling of a prior judg-
ment.”218 However, policy concerns generally foreclose the oppor-
tunity for collateral attack of even unjust decisions.219 Even if af-
forded the opportunity for collateral attack, “the court will pre-
sume that all proceedings in the original action necessary to sustain 
the validity of the judgment, were regular.”220 The party collateral-
ly attacking the judgment must rebut the presumption of validity.221 
Courts have explicitly indicated that appellate review constitutes 
the appropriate method of challenging civil judgments.222 
                                                                                                                            
218 Popp Telcom v. Am. Sharecom, Inc., 210 F.3d 928, 941 (8th Cir. 2000). 
219 Fuller v. Vanwagoner, 49 F. Supp. 281, 283 (E.D. Mich. 1942) (“[A] decree or 
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be collaterally attacked even where 
the records show that the decree was an unjust one.”); see also Bell v. Eastman Kodak 
Co., 214 F.3d 798, 800–01 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[C]ollateral attack, especially in civil cases, is 
disfavored because of the social interest in expedition and finality in litigation.”). 
220 Pen-Ken Gas & Oil Corp. v. Warfield Natural Gas Co., 137 F.2d 871, 879 (6th Cir. 
1943); see also Coleman v. Court of Appeals, 550 F. Supp. 681, 684 (W.D. Okla. 1980) 
(“[T]here is a presumption in favor of the validity of the judgment and the existence of all 
necessary jurisdictional facts.”). 
221 See United States v. City of McAlester, Okla., 410 F. Supp. 848, 853 (E.D. Okla. 
1976) (“[T]he burden is upon the party collaterally attacking a judgment to overcome the 
presumptions and establish the invalidity of a judgment by competent and convincing 
proof.”); see also Kenner v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 387 F.2d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 
1968) (“[T]here is a heavy burden both of particularized pleading and of proof upon the 
one who seeks to impeach an order or decree of a court. There must be an offer to prove 
specific facts which will pretty plainly impugn the official record.”).  
222 See Clark v. Lender Processing Servs., Inc., 949 F. Supp. 2d 763, 772 (N.D. Ohio 
2013) (“There is a firm and long-standing principle that final judgments are meant to be 
just that—final. Subject to only rare exceptions, direct attacks, i.e., appeals, by parties to 
the litigation, are the primary way that a civil judgment is challenged.”). 
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E. Ending Litigation 
Federal courts rely on the principles of res judicata and colla-
teral estoppel to finally terminate litigation.223 However, analysis of 
the requirements to bar subsequent litigation under these doctrines 
might reveal an exception through which one may legitimately va-
cate a patent validity judgment through reexamination. 
1. Res Judicata 
Res judicata stems from the ideology that “[a] party who once 
has had a chance to litigate a claim before an appropriate tribunal 
usually ought not to have another chance to do so.”224 The doc-
trine may be pleaded as “a bar, not only as respects matters actual-
ly presented to sustain or defeat the right asserted in the earlier 
proceeding, ‘but also as respects any other available matter which 
might have been presented to that end.’”225 Different circuits have 
delineated comparable elements required to bar subsequent litiga-
tion under res judicata, but the bar generally proscribes the same 
parties from arguing the same claim already finally decided.226 
Concurrent litigation of the same claims in different jurisdictions is 
not precluded,227 and equity provides for a variety of direct excep-
                                                                                                                            
223 See Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946) (“[T]here must be some end to 
litigation and . . . when one appears in court to present his case, is fully heard, and the 
contested issue is decided against him, he may not later renew the litigation in another 
court.”). 
224 SBC Commc’ns Inc. v. F.C.C., 407 F.3d 1223, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also C.I.R. 
v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948) (“The general rule of res judicata applies to 
repetitious suits involving the same cause of action. It rests upon considerations of 
economy of judicial time and public policy favoring the establishment of certainty in legal 
relations.”); Carson v. Dep’t of Energy, 398 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The 
doctrine ‘serves to relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve 
judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on 
adjudication.’”). 
225 Chicot Cnty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 378 (1940) (quoting 
Grubb v. Public Utils. Comm’n of Ohio, 281 U.S. 470, 480 (1930)). 
226 See EDP Med. Computer Sys., Inc. v. United States, 480 F.3d 621, 624 (2d Cir. 
2007) (“The doctrine bars later litigation if [an] earlier decision was (1) a final judgment 
on the merits, (2) by a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) in a case involving the same 
parties or their privies, and (4) involving the same cause of action.”). 
227 Carr v. Tillery, 591 F.3d 909, 916 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[P]arallel 
proceedings . . . pending in different jurisdictions . . . can proceed, but the judgment in the 
first case in which a final judgment on the merits is entered will be res judicata in the 
other suit if the other requirements for res judiciata . . . are satisfied.”). 
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tions.228 However, these exceptions do not necessarily encompass 
cases remanded for certain issues.229 Res judicata would therefore 
preclude a defendant who unsuccessfully counterclaimed invalidity 
in infringement litigation from subsequently asserting a reexamina-
tion finding of invalidity to vacate judgment. 
2. Collateral Estoppel 
A prior judgment typically precludes any relitigating of an issue 
of fact or law previously resolved by a valid court and necessary to 
the prior judgment.230 Implementation of the doctrine intends to 
promote efficiency and avoid inconsistent decisions.231 Interesting-
                                                                                                                            
228 See Hayes v. City of Chi., 670 F.3d 810, 815 (7th Cir. 2012). The six scenarios under 
which it would be inequitable to apply res judicata are: 
(1) the parties have agreed in terms or in effect that plaintiff may split 
his claim or the defendant has acquiesced therein; (2) the court in the 
first action expressly reserved the plaintiff’s right to maintain the 
second action; (3) the plaintiff was unable to obtain relief on his claim 
because of a restriction on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court 
in the first action; (4) the judgment in the first action was plainly 
inconsistent with the equitable implementation of a statutory scheme; 
(5) the case involves a continuing or recurrent wrong; or (6) it is 
clearly and convincingly shown that the policies favoring preclusion 
of a second action are overcome for an extraordinary reason. 
Id. Additionally, “[t]here is no general public policy exception to the operation of res 
judicata.” Apotex, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 393 F.3d 210, 219 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
229 See Bullen v. De Bretteville, 239 F.2d 824, 829 (9th Cir. 1956) (“The fact that 
several questions were deferred for later decision does not render the doctrine of res 
judicata inapplicable. A case remanded for further hearing or over which jurisdiction is 
retained for some purposes may nonetheless be final as to other issues determined.”). 
230 See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748–49 (2001) (“Issue preclusion 
generally refers to the effect of a prior judgment in foreclosing successive litigation of an 
issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential 
to the prior judgment, whether or not the issue arises on the same or a different claim.”); 
see also In re King, 500 B.R. 511, 514 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (“Generally, the proponent 
of . . . collateral estoppel must show that (1) a question of fact essential to the judgment 
was actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, (2) the same parties 
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and (3) there was mutuality of 
estoppel.”). 
231 See Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) (“Collateral 
estoppel . . . has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an 
identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by 
preventing needless litigation.”) see also Action Ink, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 959 F. 
Supp. 2d 934, 943 (E.D. La. 2013) (“[O]ne of the purposes of the doctrine is to avoid 
inconsistent decisions—a purpose that could not very well be achieved if the second court 
were entitled to reexamine the conclusions of the first to determine their correctness.”). 
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ly, collateral estoppel can be preclusive to fully litigated issues even 
prior to final judgment in an action, offering another perspective on 
the definition of judicial finality that we have previously contem-
plated.232 Conclusively litigating patent claim validity and in-
fringement thus precludes revisiting them under collateral estoppel 
even if no final judgment has been entered, suggesting that a de-
fendant’s only recourse is appeal, not assertion of a reexamination 
decision. 
IV. A CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM IN THE MAKING? A 
FIFTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS ISSUE 
We see a problem afoot in the reexamination context. If the 
posture of the case is akin to Fresenius, where liability was conclu-
sively established in court, but the remedies portion was still in 
suit, the case is still not final. Yet, a parallel reexamination that 
wipes out the patent may implicate a Fifth Amendment due 
process issue. That is, if the patentee has conclusively earned the 
liability ruling, it has in effect earned the final judgment as to that 
liability. If the PTO invalidates the patent claim and the trial court 
seeks to dismiss the case, is that not in effect taking a property right 
(the final liability judgment) from the patentee without any re-
course? Said another way, does a patentee have a vested right in 
the final liability judgment, irrespective of whatever other parts of 
the case are still pending?233 
                                                                                                                            
232 See Henglein v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 260 F.3d 201, 209–210 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(“[F]inality for purposes of issue preclusion is a more ‘pliant’ concept than it would be in 
other contexts.”); Mikels v. City of Durham, 183 F.3d 323 (4th Cir. 1999); Swentek v. 
USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 561 (4th Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds (“Finality for 
purposes of collateral estoppel is a flexible concept.”); Miller Brewing Co. v. Joseph 
Schlitz Brewing Co., 605 F.2d 990, 996 (7th Cir. 1979) (“To be ‘final’ for purposes of 
collateral estoppel the decision need only be immune, as a practical matter, to reversal or 
amendment. ‘Finality’ in the sense of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 is not required.”); Zdanok v. 
Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327 F.2d 944, 955 (2d Cir. 1964) (“[C]ollateral 
estoppel does not require a judgment which ends the litigation and leaves nothing for the 
court to do but execute the judgment, but includes many dispositions which, though not 
final in that sense, have nevertheless been fully litigated.”). 
233 See, e.g., Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 
(1948) (“[j]udgments within the powers vested in [Article III] courts . . . may not be 
unlawfully revised, overturned or refused faith and credit by another Department of 
Government”); Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U.S. 600, 603 (1923) (“the private rights of 
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A nuanced approach to this argument may flow from the vested 
right to the liability judgment. If the patentee has earned a vested 
property right in the liability judgment, then it stands to reason that 
he has also earned the consequences or rewards to that judgment. 
In other words, the current reexamination regime wipes out the 
damages because the patent cancelation occurs during the case it-
self (i.e., because there is no final judgment). On the other hand, 
under this nuanced approach, the patentee is not arguing that his 
entitlement to damages flows from the fact that finality has been 
achieved, but rather flows from his entitlement to the rewards of 
owning a property right in the liability judgment. 
The danger of basing the damages on the property right in the 
judgment is that the Supreme Court has also stated that property 
rights may be expropriated (i.e., “taken”) for public purposes.234 In 
Kelo v. City of New London, the Court permitted the taking of pri-
vate property for a public purpose (as opposed to a public use), and 
accordingly, a court could still wipe out the judgment under some 
public purpose; the public purpose of removing liability for infring-
ing a patent was found to be invalid.235 
V. THE OBVIOUS REMEDY—CONGRESSIONAL ACTION TO 
LIMIT THE EFFECT OF REEXAMINATION 
As described herein, there is no constitutional problem with the 
PTO canceling a claim during a reexamination and having the pa-
                                                                                                                            
parties which have been vested by the judgment of a court cannot be taken away by 
subsequent legislation, but must be thereafter enforced by the court regardless of such 
legislation”); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 478 (1899) (“it is undoubtedly 
true that legislatures cannot set aside the judgments of courts”); United States v. 
O’Grady, 89 U.S. 641, 647–48 (1874) (invalidating attempt by Congress to revise a final 
judgment entered by the Court of Claims because, “where no appeal is taken to [Supreme 
Court], [such judgments] are, under existing laws, absolutely conclusive of the rights of 
the parties, unless a new trial is granted by [Claims] court”); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & 
Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421, 431 (1855) (“[an] act of congress cannot have the effect 
and operation to annul the judgment of the court already rendered, or the rights 
determined thereby”); Massingill v. Downs, 48 U.S 760, 768 (1849) (“no legislative act 
can change the rights and liabilities of parties which have been established by solemn 
judgment”). 
234 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 496–97 (2005). 
235 Id. at 489. 
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rallel court dismiss the lawsuit so long as any aspect of the lawsuit 
is still pending.236 A first obvious remedy is to have Congress step 
in and legislate (versus judicial intervention) the scope and effect of 
a reexamination. Legislation would need to be carefully worded to 
avoid a potential separation of powers problem. Legislation may be 
crafted that either requires a court to dismiss an action, or may 
more subtly remove the case by stating that in the event of a can-
celed claim, the parallel no longer possesses jurisdiction. There are 
ways to craft the law so as to avoid having the law tell the courts 
what to do. 
In a congressional fix to reexaminations, Congress stepped in to 
overrule the In re Portola Packing case.237 There, the question raised 
was, what is a substantial “new” question of patentability?238 The 
Federal Circuit held that a “new” question was one that the PTO 
had not previously considered.239 As such, reexaminations could 
only be predicated on really “new” questions that used new art not 
considered by the PTO before.240 Congress stepped in and legisla-
tively overruled Portola Packaging and allowed for new questions to 
be raised even when the PTO had considered the prior art pre-
viously.241 
VI. A PRACTICAL REMEDY—SPEEDY LITIGATIONS 
We see from the above discussion that litigants are faced with a 
dilemma. The dilemma is one of speed versus cost and efficiency. 
A patentee, in its best interest, should try to achieve final judgment 
on the patent litigation side prior to resolution of a co-pending 
reexamination.242 So, it behooves a patentee to litigate a case in its 
entirety as quickly as possible. As such, the patentee will litigate 
                                                                                                                            
236 See infra notes 244–51 and accompanying text. 
237 In re Portola Packaging, 110 F.3d 786, 791 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
238 Id. at 788. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
241 Id.; see also In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (discussing 
history of Portola Packaging and the congressional overrides). 
242 See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(“[W]hen a claim is cancelled, the patentee loses any cause of action based on that claim, 
and any pending litigation in which the claims are asserted becomes moot”). 
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both the liability and damages portions together. However, litigat-
ing the case entirely is costly and resource-intensive. Moreover, the 
district court may not stay a co-pending litigation, thereby making 
it costly and inefficient to prosecute a litigation and defend against 
a reexamination simultaneously.243 
A defendant, on the other hand, may seek to bifurcate liability 
from damages and remedies.244 For the defendant, it is more effi-
cient and speedy to bifurcate the case under the theory that it is 
pointless to adjudicate remedies and damages if in fact there is no 
liability.245 There is also the tactical advantage that, until there is 
some finality, the defendant has time to prosecute a co-pending 
reexamination to expunge the patent. A defendant may also insti-
gate an early reexamination and seek a stay of the co-pending litiga-
tion, thereby arguing to the judge that scarce judicial resources are 
conserved and the PTO expertise on the patent’s validity will re-
sult in a better outcome. 
We believe that the proper resolution is that a patentee is the 
master of its lawsuit and, as an instigator of the suit, must suffer the 
consequences of potential time delays caused by bifurcation and/or 
a stay of district court litigation. The patentee chose to bring suit 
and subject the defendant to suit. To this end, the defendant is en-
titled to exercise whatever rights it has to stay litigation, seek bifur-
cation that undoubtedly results in delay, and institute a reexamina-
tion to knock out the patent.246 
                                                                                                                            
243 See Robert Bosch Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. Cardiocom, LLC, No. C-14-1575 EMC, 
2014 WL 3107447, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 2014) (“A court may grant a stay ‘in order to 
avoid inconsistent results, narrow the issues, obtain guidance from the PTO, or simply to 
avoid the needless waste of judicial resources, especially if the evidence suggests that the 
patents-in-suit will not survive reexamination.’”). 
244 See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). See also Real v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 195 F.R.D. 618, 620 
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (“Bifurcation in patent cases, as in others, is the exception, not the 
rule.”); Remcor Prods. Co. v. Servend Int’l Inc., No. 93-C-1823, 1994 WL 594723 (N.D. 
Ill. Oct. 28, 1994); THK Am. Inc. v. NSK Co. Ltd., 151 F.R.D. 625 (N.D. Ill.1993); 
Kimberly–Clark Corp. v. James River Corp. of Va., 131 F.R.D. 607, 608 (N.D. Ga.1989); 
Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett–Packard Co., 791 F.Supp. 113, 114 (E.D. La.1992) (“[C]ourts 
should not order separate trials unless such a disposition is clearly necessary.”). 
245 See Remcor Prods. Co., 1994 WL 594723, at *1. 
246 It is not unfair for a party to avail itself of any statutory remedy it has that Congress 
intended it to have. See Parmenter v. Wal Mart Stores, E., L.P., No. 3:06CV1585 PCD, 
2007 WL 2071625 (D. Conn. 2007) (“Rather, where there is a statutory remedy 
addressing the public policy at issue, courts should adhere to the statutory remedial 
2014] SEPARATION OF POWERS OR SEPARATION OF LAW 53 
 
We also believe that the system, as it exists, is sufficient to pro-
tect the rights of patentees. If the patentee escapes reexamination 
with claims intact, then liability is further established. Further-
more, though not binding on a trial court, we imagine that a patent 
that escapes reexamination will be shrouded by even greater pro-
tection by the trial court. 
VII. THE EFFECT OF PARALLEL REEXAMINATION IN 
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LITIGATION 
Parallel reexamination may impact the unique world of Hatch–
Waxman Act brand-generic drug patent litigation.247 The Hatch–
Waxman Act is very complicated, as it creates a prospective patent 
litigation consequence.248 In this context, the generic drug compa-
ny usually develops the generic drug version in view of various 
brand company patents. Usually, when the generic drug company 
files its generic drug dossier with the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (“FDA”), it will certify to the FDA that one or more patents 
in question are not an obstacle to FDA approval of the dossier.249 
Later, the generic drug company must notify the brand company 
that the dossier has been filed and certifications to various patents 
have been lodged.250 This allows the brand company to sue the ge-
neric company for patent infringement.251 The lawsuit to vet out 
                                                                                                                            
scheme dictated by the legislature, since ‘we can presume that the legislature would have 
provided additional relief in the statute if it thought it necessary.’”). 
247 The Hatch–Waxman Act is the name commonly used to refer to the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–417, 98 Stat. 1585 
(1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360(cc) (2000), 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2000)), 
amended by Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, 
Pub. L. No. 108–173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). 
248 See Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (“In order to bring about early resolution of patent disputes between generics and 
pioneering drug companies, the Act provides that the filing of a Paragraph IV 
Certification is an act of patent infringement.”). 
249 UPADHYE, supra note 65, § 10:5. 
250 Id. 
251 See Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1356 (“For Paragraph IV ANDAs, the timing of approval 
depends upon two events: (1) whether the pioneer drug company brings an infringement 
action within 45 days of learning of the Paragraph IV ANDA filing, and (2) whether the 
company seeking approval was the first one to file an ANDA containing a Paragraph IV 
Certification to a listed patent.”). 
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the patent issues runs parallel to the FDA approval process.252 If 
the patentee wins the lawsuit, then the FDA is forbidden from ap-
proving the dossier until the underlying patent expires.253 If the pa-
tentee loses, then the generic company may obtain final dossier ap-
proval and launch the product. The launch of the generic drug 
product prior to ultimate final resolution may cause serious market 
damage to the brand company and subject the generic company to 
significant patent damages.254 Accordingly, to maximize its ability 
to market the drug and to minimize the risk of damage, the generic 
drug company needs to win. 
In the first instance, the generic drug company can instigate a 
reexamination prior to filing the generic drug dossier. The benefits 
of instigating and/or concluding a reexamination include not hav-
ing to certify the patent later and litigate a patent.255 If the patent is 
                                                                                                                            
252 See Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“If the 
patentee files an infringement action within the designated 45-day period, the FDA may 
not approve the ANDA until 30 months have passed, unless the case is decided before 
then or the 30–month period is modified by the court before which the infringement 
action is pending.”). 
253 See UPADHYE, supra note 65, § 16:3; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(A) (2012) (“(4) 
For an act of infringement described in paragraph (2)— (A) the court shall order the 
effective date of any approval of the drug or veterinary biological product involved in the 
infringement to be a date which is not earlier than the date of the expiration of the patent 
which has been infringed.”). 
254 See, e.g., Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Glenmark Pharm. Inc., USA, 748 
F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (affirming patent validity) (“Trial was to a jury. 
Glenmark admitted infringement, and the jury held that the ′244 patent had not been 
proved invalid. The jury awarded $15,200,000 in lost profits and $803,514 in price 
erosion damages.”); Astrazeneca AB v. Apotex Corp., 985 F. Supp. 2d 452, 460 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2013) (“This Opinion concludes that Astra is entitled to a reasonable 
royalty for Apotex’s infringement of the Patents in the amount of 50% of Apotex’s profits 
on its infringing sales or $76,021,994.50, plus pre-judgment interest.”). 
255 If the patent is cancelled such that no claim remains in the patent for which the 
brand drug product is claimed, then the patentee must delist the patent. 21 U.S.C. § 
355(b)(1)(G) (“The applicant shall file with the application the patent number and the 
expiration date of any patent which claims the drug for which the applicant submitted the 
application or which claims a method of using such drug and with respect to which a 
claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the 
owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug. If an application is filed under 
this subsection for a drug and a patent which claims such drug or a method of using such 
drug is issued after the filing date but before approval of the application, the applicant 
shall amend the application to include the information required by the preceding 
sentence. Upon approval of the application, the Secretary shall publish information 
submitted under the two preceding sentences.”). 
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broad, a reexamination may nullify or narrow the patent sufficiently 
so as to guide the development and avoid patent liability.256 The 
drawback is that, by nullifying or narrowing the patent, it may allow 
competitor generic companies to free ride on the efforts of the in-
stigating company. Accordingly, there is a free-rider problem, 
though the consumers at large benefit from increased competi-
tion.257 
A second instance where reexamination may prove useful is 
when Paragraph IV litigation just starts. As discussed above, a dis-
trict court judge may choose to stay any co-pending litigation in 
favor of the co-pending reexamination.258 Because the district court 
uses the heightened standard of invalidity (i.e., clear and convinc-
ing evidence), conceivably it is “easier” to invalidate the claims in 
reexamination because of the lower thresholds at the PTO.259 Ac-
                                                                                                                            
256 See In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (“In a very real sense, 
the intent underlying reexamination is to ‘start over’ in the PTO with respect to the 
limited examination areas involved, and to re examine the claims, and to examine new or 
amended claims, as they would have been considered if they had been originally examined 
in light of all of the prior art of record in the reexamination proceeding.”). 
257 Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., CIV. 02-1512-SLR, 2008 WL 4809116, at *2 
(D. Del. Nov. 5, 2008) (“I am not persuaded by the case law defendants cite for the 
proposition that the prevention of ‘free riding’ is a legitimate business justification. 
Indeed, the Hatch–Waxman Act establishes and condones the opposite proposition, the 
‘piggybacking’ of generics. Based on the reasoning of such cases as SmithKline Beecham 
Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F.Supp.2d 1011 (N.D.Ill.2003), if defendants present their ‘free 
riding’ argument, I will include an instruction that such conduct is lawful.”) (citing 
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1051–52 (N.D. Ill. 
2003), aff’d, 365 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004), opinion vacated on reh’g en banc, 403 F.3d 
1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005), superseded, 403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005), aff’d on other grounds, 
403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“SmithKline points out that Apotex wants to take a free 
ride (“usurping,” SmithKline calls it) on the considerable investment made by 
SmithKline in obtaining FDA approval for Paxil. It is indeed much easier to establish 
bioequivalence than it is to convince the FDA that an original drug is safe and effective. 
But that kind of free riding the law permits, and indeed the Hatch–Waxman Act 
encourages. Moreover, free riding is an integral part of the scheme of the patent law. In 
exchange for the exclusive and in the case of Paxil very valuable rights that a valid patent 
grants, the patentee is required to make public disclosure of the steps required to create 
the patented product, so that when the patent expires and the patented product enters the 
public domain competitors can manufacture the product. Those competitors are free 
riders with a vengeance. But they are lawful free riders. And so is Apotex.”)). 
258 See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
259 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.555 (“A prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim pending in a 
reexamination proceeding is established when the information compels a conclusion that 
a claim is unpatentable under the preponderance of evidence, burden-of-proof standard, 
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cordingly, because of the speed associated with the reexamination, 
it may be that the PTO nullifies the challenged patent whilst the 
litigation is stayed. When the PTO nullifies the patent (or the Fed-
eral Circuit after appeal affirms the invalidity), the generic drug 
company will then domesticate the reexamination verdict into the 
district court process. Once the district court enters judgment, any 
residual 30-month litigation stay will be terminated and, if the ge-
neric drug dossier is in a condition of approval, then the dossier will 
be finally approved.260 Therefore, the reexamination pathway pro-
vides for the ability to avoid a co-pending litigation before a district 
court.261 
A third instance where reexamination may prove beneficial is 
the avoidance of parallel district court litigation in which the court 
has already adjudicated the patent validity. For example, suppose 
the brand drug company has already sued generic company #1 and 
won. Under the rules, therefore, the generic company #1’s generic 
drug dossier cannot be approved until the relevant patent ex-
pires.262 
Generic drug company #2 may wish to challenge the patent, 
but would know that the brand company is likely to sue company 
#2 in the very same court and preferably the very same judge as 
before. The likelihood that #2 will prevail where #1 failed is low, so 
#2 decides to file a reexamination without provoking the district 
court litigation. To do so, #2 may choose to file the generic drug 
dossier with a so-called Paragraph III Certification to the relevant 
patent.263 This means that the dossier will be substantively re-
viewed by the FDA, but the brand drug company neither knows 
                                                                                                                            
giving each term it’s broadest possible construction consistent with the 
specification . . . .”). 
260 The 30-month litigation stay expires with a district court judgment that the patent is 
no longer considered blocking. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012). 
261 See, e.g., Amneal Pharms. LLC v. Supernus Pharms., Inc., IPR 2013-00368, IPR 
2013-00371, & IPR 2013-00372 (P.T.A.B.). Here, Amneal was not the first generic 
company to challenge the patents. 
262 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(A) (2012) (“(4) For an act of infringement described in 
paragraph (2)—(A) the court shall order the effective date of any approval of the drug or 
veterinary biological product involved in the infringement to be a date which is not earlier 
than the date of the expiration of the patent which has been infringed.”). 
263 Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1285 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
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about the pending dossier nor can institute suit (because the com-
pany did not file a Paragraph IV Certification to instigate suit). 
By instigating a reexamination instead of challenging the patent 
in court, the generic drug company #2 may utilize the exact same 
prior art that the district court previously vetted to invalidate the 
patent.264 Moreover, because of the limited discovery allowed, the 
costs are significantly cheaper.265 In addition, the invalidation of 
the patent in reexamination coupled with the termination of the 
district court case may dislodge company #1 to earn dossier ap-
proval and launch the product. In essence, if company #1 has the 
so-called 180-Day Exclusivity, the launch will start that clock run-
ning.266 Under the forfeiture laws, if company #1 cannot launch 
(for any other reason), then the domestication of the judgment may 
cause a forfeiture of the 180-Day Exclusivity.267 In short, subse-
quent dossier filers may use the reexamination to not only dislodge 
a patent barrier proven to exist in the mind of a court, but also to 
gain a competitive advantage in the generic drug marketplace.268 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article we have illustrated the full ramifications of the 
concept of reexamination of a patent through the PTO and its ef-
fect on federal court litigation. We proposed that the courts should 
unify certain aspects of reexamination with parallel (or prior) fed-
eral court litigation. We debunked the allegations that a constitu-
                                                                                                                            
264 See 35 U.S.C. § 301 (2012). 
265 Id. § 316(a)(5). 
266 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (2012). 
267 Id. § 355(j)(5)(D(i)(I). 
268 See, e.g., Ranbaxy Labs. v. Vertex Pharms., Inc., IPR 2013-0024 (P.T.A.B. June 18, 
2013) (regarding fosamprenavir). Vertex sued Mylan in traditional Paragraph IV litigation 
regarding the ‘989 patent. Several months later, Ranbaxy instigated an IPR against the 
‘989 patent by arguing obviousness. Within a few months, Ranbaxy and Vertex settled the 
IPR and future Hatch-Waxman Paragraph IV litigation. IPR 2013-0024, Paper No. 69. 
Meanwhile, Mylan continued to fight the patent in parallel litigation when the trial judge 
denied Mylan’s motion to stay its litigation pending resolution of the parallel IPR. VIIV 
Healthcare Co. v. Mylan, Inc., CV 12-1065-RGA, 2013 WL 6094289 (D. Del. Sept. 17, 
2013). See also Apotex v. Alcon, IPR 2013-00012 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 19, 2013) (regarding 
moxifloxacin). There, Apotex did not challenge the patents in court, likely knowing that 
the trial judge and appeals court held the patent valid. Apotex successfully instigated an 
IPR on the base patent but ultimately settled its IPR. 
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tional crisis is afoot. We also debunked the allegation that somehow 
running a parallel reexamination is unfair to the patentee. We also 
examined the heady civil procedure rules of finality and how finali-
ty of a judgment can be either solidified or nullified through reex-
amination. We also are concerned that the courts are being called 
upon to correct perceived inequalities, when in fact the remedy (as 
is often the case with statutory application) rests with Congress to 
amend the statutes appropriately.269 
 
                                                                                                                            
269 See Wyeth v. Kappos, 591 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Regardless of the 
potential of the statute to produce slightly different consequences for applicants under 
similar situations, this court does not take upon itself the role of correcting all statutory 
inequities, even if it could. In the end, the law has put a policy in effect that this court 
must enforce, not criticize or correct.”). 
